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ARTICLE

FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXATION AND THE ROLE OF
STATE LAW: DOES THE MARITAL DEDUCTION STRIKE
THE PROPER BALANCE?
Mitchell M. Gans*
INTRODUCTION

The federal transfer-tax system often makes state law a critical determinant.
This is a necessary feature of a system that taxes the transfer of property, a
concept that ordinarily derives its meaning from state law. As a matter of federal tax policy, however, it is important that the system neither overemphasize
nor underemphasize state law. Part I undertakes a consideration of the role of
state law in the transfer-tax system and the negative consequences that occur
where the tax law fails to strike the proper balance.
Part II then focuses on the marital deduction, applying the framework
developed in Part I. The marital deduction, which exempts transfers between
spouses from tax, is central to the system. From its inception, the marital
deduction has given state law a pivotal role. In order to qualify for the
deduction, the decedent spouse's property must pass to the surviving spouse
under state law: the so-called "passing" requirement. In 1948, when the
martial deduction was originally created, it had a limited function: to maintain
parity between couples residing in common-law and community-property
states. And in the context of this limited function, the passing requirement's
state law component made sense. However, when the marital deduction was
reformulated in 1981, it assumed a broader function. In the context of that
broader function, it will be argued, it no longer makes sense to make the
marital deduction turn upon whether the property passes under state law. In
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other words, in light of the 1981 amendment, the passing requirement
inappropriately emphasizes state law.
Part I considers how the passing requirement might be modified to cure
its overemphasis on state law. Several alternatives are examined, drawing
upon a theme implicit in the 1981 reformulation. Two of the more modest
alternatives would simply overrule the Supreme Court's decision in
Commissionerv. Estate of Bosch,' which adopted a construction of the statute
that in effect exacerbates its overemphasis on state law. The less modest
alternatives would make state law completely irrelevant. Instead, the
availability of the deduction would be made to depend upon whether the
decedent spouse's property would eventually be subject to tax in the surviving
spouse's estate (if not consumed). In short, the focus would no longer be on
the method by which the surviving spouse acquired the decedent spouse's
property, but rather on whether the property would trigger a tax at the death of
the surviving spouse.
I. STATE LAW: STRIKING THE PROPER BALANCE

State law is often determinative in matters of federal taxation.2 This is
particularly so in the transfer-tax context.3 Indeed, the very decision to impose

' 387 U.S. 456 (1967).

2 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6) (1994 & Supp. 1111997) (establishing a special basis rule for property

held under state community property law); Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (finding
that surviving spouse's rights under state law must be established in order to determine the availability of the
estate-tax marital deduction); Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942) (examining the nature of the parties'
rights under state law to determine if the trust's grantor was subject to income tax on trust income); Morgan
v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940) (deeming it necessary to ascertain the nature of property rights under
state law in order to determine estate tax consequence); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (finding
state law relevant in determining, for income tax purposes, the validity of an assignment of a beneficiary's
interest under a trust); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (relying on state law to determine which spouse
in a community property state was taxable on community income); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
1294 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding it necessary to examine the nature of a claim under
state law to determine if amounts received with respect to the claim are excludible under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2));
see generally RICHARD B. STEPHENs ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION I 4.05[2][a], at 4-101
(6th ed. 1991); Edmond N. Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799 (1943) (cited with approval by the Court in Bosch, 387 U.S. at 479 n.8); Paul L. Caron, The Role of State Court DecisionsIn Federal Tax Litigation:Bosch, Erie, and Beyond, 71 ORE. L. REv. 781, 782-83 (1992); Richard B. Stephens &
James J. Freeland, The Role of Local Law and Local Adjudications in FederalTax Controversies,46 MINN.
L. REv. 223 (1961).
3 See Morgan, 309 U.S. at 80-81; see also Bosch, 387 U.S. at 462-65; STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2,
4.05[2][a], at 4-101; Gilbert Paul Verbit, State CourtDecisions In Federal TransferTax Litigation:Bosch
Revisited, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. &TR. J. 407, 407-08 (1988).
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a federal excise tax on the transfer of wealth 4 necessarily implicates state law,
because the question whether a decedent has made a transfer of a particular
item of wealth can be resolved only by examining the decedent's transfer
rights,5 which normally are the exclusive concern of state law.6
As a matter of policy, the tax law should not permit discrimination among
taxpayers on the basis of arbitrary or improper criteria. As a matter of constitutional law, the principle of uniformity requires that two taxpayers living in
different states not be taxed differently on that account.9 At the same time, in
order to avoid inappropriate discrimination, taxpayers living in different states
must be1o taxed differently where relevant differences in state law make it necessary.

4 See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 57, 60 (1939) (holding that estate tax is an
excise tax imposed on the transfer of property at death).
5 See, e.g., Estate of DiMarco v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 653, 662-63 (1986), action on decision, (Sept.
24, 1990) (holding that an "act of transfer" must occur in order to trigger the estate or gift tax and that such
an act does not occur unless the decedent or donor had the right to select the beneficiary); Estate of Miller v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. 657 (1950) (in accord with DiMarco); STEPHlENs Er AL., supra note 2, 4.05[2] [a],
at 4-101.
6 See, e.g., Morgan, 309 U.S. at 80-81 (indicating that state law determines the nature of the underlying legal interests and rights for purposes of federal transfer taxation). On occasion, however, federal law
will determine the content of these rights. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-102, 1976-1 C.B. 272 (determining that
coal miner's benefit payable to decedent's spouse was not includible in gross estate because, under federal
statute, decedent did not have right to select recipient); Rev. Rul. 67-277, 1967-2 C.B. 322 (finding certain
Social Security benefits payable to decedent's spouse not includible in gross estate because, under applicable
federal statute, decedent did not have right to control selection of recipient).
7 See Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139
(1989); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REv. 191 (1992); Richard A. Musgrave,
Horizontal Equity: A FurtherNote, 1 FLA. TAX REv. 354 (1993); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity,
Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1990). Use of improper or arbitrary criteria could render a tax questionable in constitutional terms as well. The courts are "especially deferential" to the legislature in the tax context and are therefore typically reluctant to strike down classifications or distinctions contained in tax legislation. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (indicating that the Court is "especially deferential" in
the tax context and upholding, under the rational-basis test, California's real property tax system even
though it imposed a greater tax on newcomers than on homeowners of longer duration). Nevertheless, a tax
imposed on the basis of one's religion would surely violate the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (indicating that a tax on the wearing of yarmulkes could not be sustained because it would constitute a tax on the basis of religion).
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
9 See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 84-90 (1900) (holding that the uniformity requirement contemplates a prohibition against geography-based discrimination); see also Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and
the Constitution, 99 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1999); Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "DirectTaxes":
Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?97 COLUM. L. REv. 2334, 2340 (1997).
10 See generally Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967) (taking state law into account
in determining the availability of the marital deduction); Morgan, 309 U.S. at 78 (indicating that state law
must be taken into account for transfer-tax purposes where relevant).
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In any given case, deciding whether, or the extent to which, state law
should be determinative of a federal tax issue can be difficult." An
overemphasis or underemphasis on state law can be problematic. In the case
of an underemphasis, the tax base is distorted, and inappropriate discrimination
occurs-or, in tax parlance, principles of equity are violated. 2 In the case of
an overemphasis, equity violations and distortions in the tax base also result; in
addition, distortions in behavior occur, opportunities for taxpayers with

sophisticated counsel to take advantage of the tax system emerge, and,
ultimately, inappropriate considerations shape state law.
A. Underemphasisand Its Consequences

To illustrate the problematic aspects of an underemphasis on state law,
consider how the issue of adverse possession would be treated for transfer tax
purposes if federal law were determinative. Assume that a taxpayer's property
has been in the possession of an adverse claimant for eight years and that,
under state law, a claim to recover property from an adverse claimant is barred
after six years. As a matter of state law, the taxpayer, having lost all interest in
the property, would be unable to transfer or control it by will. Consequently,
under current law, if the taxpayer were to die, the property would not be
included in the taxpayer's gross estate.' 3 If Congress were to amend the Code
to establish, for transfer tax purposes, a federal rule of ten years for adversepossession claims, the property would be included in the taxpayer's gross
estate, even though, under state law, the taxpayer had no interest in the
I1 For example, there is presently a conflict in the federal circuits over the deductibility of estate
administration expenses under I.R.C. § 2053 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
Several circuits hold that
administration expenses, in order to be deductible, must satisfy state-law standards and be reasonable as a
matter of federal law. One circuit holds that state law provides the sole test for deductibility and is therefore
determinative. Compare Estate of Millikin v. Commissioner, 125 F.3d 339, 343-44 (6th Cir. 1997); Estate
of Love v. Commissioner, 923 F.2d 335, 337 (4th Cir. 1991); Marcus v. DeWitt, 704 F.2d 1227, 1229-30
(11th Cir. 1983); Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 741, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1978); Estate of Smith v.
Commissioner, 510 F.2d 479, 482-83 & n.4 (2d Cir. 1975) and Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651, 659
(5th Cir. 1967), with Estate of Jenner v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 1100, 1106 (7th Cir. 1978).
12 It is conceivable that an underemphasis on state law might raise constitutional questions as well. In
Knowlton, the Court upheld the estate tax, against a constitutional challenge that it was a direct tax and
therefore had to be apportioned, on the ground that the tax was imposed on the act of transferring property.
178 U.S. at 56; see also Ackerman, supranote 9, at 32-33. If a tax were imposed without regard to the taxpayer's transfer rights under state law, it could well be viewed as an unconstitutional direct tax (because of
its failure to comply with the apportionment requirement). See Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-42-003 (July 2, 1998)
(intimating that the imposition of the transfer tax where no transfer of wealth has actually occurred would be
viewed as a direct tax that, because it was not apportioned, would be unconstitutional).
13 Cf Estate of Beggs v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 131, 136-37 (1949) (finding creditor who, prior to her
death, allowed statute of limitations to run on debt not required to include debt in her gross estate).
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property at the time of death and therefore could not transfer it. Thus, the
underemphasis on state law effected by federalizing the rule concerning
adverse possession would result in distorting the tax base by creating a wealth
transfer 4for tax purposes that did not correspond to an actual transfer of
wealth.
To illustrate how an underemphasis could produce equity violations, consider how two taxpayers living in different states would be treated for tax purposes under a federalized adverse possession rule. Assume that Taxpayer A is
domiciled in State X and that Taxpayer B is domiciled in State Y. Assume
further that Taxpayer A and Taxpayer B both own real property in their domiciliary states and that the property, in both cases, has been in the possession of
an adverse claimant for eight years. If, under the law of State X, a claim to recover property from an adverse claimant is barred after six years, the property
would not be included in Taxpayer A's gross estate. In contrast, if under the
law of State Y, such a claim is barred after ten years, the property would be
included in Taxpayer B's gross estate under current law if he or she were to
die before the expiration of the ten-year period. This disparity in Taxpayer A's
and Taxpayer B's transfer-tax outcome would be appropriate, because the
amount of wealth transferred by Taxpayer B at death is greater than the
amount transferred by Taxpayer A. Indeed, equity dictates that the Code discriminate between these two taxpayers. But if Congress were to establish a
federal ten-year rule for transfer tax purposes, this discrimination would disappear and inequity would result in that both taxpayers would be required to indlude the property in their gross estate, even though Taxpayer A could not
control or transfer the property by will under state law, while Taxpayer B
could. Simply put, providing the same tax outcome for differently situated
taxpayers is not equitable.

14 Under current law, a person losing title to an adverse claimant in a hostile context-which would
ordinarily be the case given the state-law requirement that such claims be hostile, see R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 334 (1983)-would not be subject to gift tax
because the loss is analogous to consumption or a decline in the value of an investment. But cf. Rev. Rul.
81-264, 1981-2 C.B. 185 (ruling that permitting the statute of limitations to run on a debt in the context of a
family transaction constitutes a taxable gift, but indicating that it would not constitute a taxable gift if the
taxpayer permitted it to run inadvertently and in the ordinary course of business); see also Estate of Lang v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 404, 413 (1975), aft'd,613 F.2d 770, (9th Cir. 1980) (supporting the result of Rev.
Rul. 81-264).
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B. Overemphasisand Its Consequences
To illustrate the consequences of an overemphasis on state law, consider
I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6) ("section 1014(b)(6)"), which establishes the rule for
determining basis with respect to community property. 6 Under the provision,
a surviving spouse's basis in his or her share of community property is equal to
its fair market value on the date of death of the deceased spouse. Thus, all
community property-the deceased spouse's share as well as the surviving
spouse's share--enjoys a basis equal to fair market value determined as of the
date of the deceased spouse's death. 7 If a couple has community property
with a basis of $100,000 and one spouse dies when the property has a fair
market value of $1,000,000, the surviving spouse's basis in the property will
be $1,000,000. In contrast, a couple living in a common law state and owning
all of their property jointly enjoys the date-of-death basis rule only with respect
to the deceased spouse's share, with the surviving spouse's basis in his or her
share not changing on account of the other spouse's death. 8 If the aggregate
value of the couple's jointly owned property is $1,000,000 when one spouse
dies and each spouse enjoyed a pre-death basis of $50,000 in his or her share,
the surviving spouse's basis in the property would be $550,000 (the surviving
spouse's basis of $50,000 in his or her share and the date-of-death value of the
deceased spouse's share). Thus, the special community-property basis rule
produces equity violations: 9 two couples identically situated receive
significantly different tax treatment in terms of basis simply because one
chooses to live in a community property state and the other chooses to live in a
common law state.Y
I' See I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6) (1994 & Supp. II 1997).
16 See I.R.C. § 1014(b)(6) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
17 See Arthur W. Andrews, Community Propertywith Right ofSurvivorship: Uneasy Lies the Head that
Wears a Crown of Surviving Spouse for Federal Income Tax Basis Purposes, 17 VA. TAX REv. 577, 579
(1998).
18 See id. at 580-81. Utilizing the date-of-death value under section 1014 can actually result in a disadvantage to the taxpayer where the date-of-death value is less than the pre-death basis. See Jonathan G.
Blattmachr et al., Tax Planning with Consensual Community Property: Alaska's New Community Property
Law, 33 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 615, 624 (1999). Because, however, assets generally tend to increase in
value over time (by virtue of inflation, market appreciation or, in the case of corporate stock, retained earnings), section 1014 is ordinarily favorable to the taxpayer. See id.
19 Recognizing the inappropriateness of section 1014(b)(6), Treasury recently proposed its repeal. See
Treas. Release 1999-4614 (Feb. 1, 1999); see also Treasury Dept., Treasury Releases Explanation of Administration's2000 Budget Proposal,TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 2, 1999, at 21-36, available in LEXIS, TNT
file.
20 It is, of course, true that, in a common law state, all of a couple's property could receive a basis
equal to date-of-death value upon the death of the first spouse to die if all of the property is titled in that
spouse's name. But, in order to achieve this, it would be necessary for the couple to anticipate the order of
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When the Code creates or tolerates such inequity, taxpayers can be expected to seek changes in state law and to seek to exploit state-law provisions
that are taxpayer friendly. Not surprisingly, Alaska recently enacted legislation that enables couples residing in or outside of Alaska to convert noncommunity property into community property by contributing it to a trust situated in Alaska and making an election to have it so treated.2' Under this legislation, assuming that its validity for tax purposes is sustained2 couples residing in common-law states who wish to take advantage of the communityproperty basis rule can do so through the simple expedient of establishing a
trust in Alaska.
Such tax-driven state legislation is neither a new phenomenon nor an uncommon one. For example, prior to 1948, community property legislation was
enacted by some states to enable couples to enjoy income splitting for federal
income tax purposes.2' Some of these states repealed the legislation after the
Code was amended in 1948 to establish income splitting as a matter of federal
law.U
For an example under current law not involving community property,
consider the interaction between the generation-skipping tax and the rule
against perpetuities. Under the generation-skipping tax, each taxpayer is
entitled to an exemption of just over one million dollars.2s If the taxpayer
allocates the exemption to a transfer made in trust, neither distributions from
the trust nor a termination of the trust will constitute a taxable event for

their deaths and to title the assets accordingly. But see I.R.C. § 1014(e) (1994 & Supp. I 1997) (denying a
date-of-death basis for assets acquired by the decedent within one year of death in certain circumstances).
21 See ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.100 (Michie 1998); see also Blattmachr et al., supra note 18, at 616-17.
The statute does require that at least one trustee be, in effect, an Alaska domiciliary. See ALASKA STAT. §
34.77.100(a) (1998).
22 Questions have been raised as to whether property held as community property under such an opt-in
approach can be viewed as constituting community property within the meaning of section 1014(b)(6). See
Blattmachr et al., supra note 18, at 624-31 (arguing that section 1014(b)(6) should apply in the context of
Alaska's opt-in approach but acknowledging arguments to the contrary).
23 In Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), the Court held that couples living in a community property
state could split their income, whereas couples living in a common law state could not. For the purpose of
permitting their residents to take advantage of this decision, some states enacted community property legislation. See Stanley Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family--The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARv. L. REV.
1097, 1104 (1948).
24 See Surrey, supranote 23, at 1111.
25 See I.R.C. § 2631 (1994 & Supp. II 1997). Pursuant to I.R.C. § 2631(c), the exemption amount is
increased for inflation after 1998. Id. § 2631(c). In 1999, the exemption amount is $1,010,000. See Rev.
Proc. 98-61, 1998-52 I.R.B. 18.
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generation-skipping tax purposes. 26 The longer the term of the trust, the longer
the exemption will be effective and the more the family will save in transfer
taxes. 27 Congress failed to include in the Code a durational limit on
generation-skipping-exempt trusts, presumably on the rationale that the rule
against perpetuities under state law would prevent taxpayers from unduly
extending their term. Seeking to exploit this failure, various states have altered
or repealed the rule against perpetuities, 2s thereby permitting taxpayers who
locate their generation-skipping-exempt trust in one of these states 9 to make
the trust last forever and enjoy greater tax savings. ° Aware of Congress's
failure and the states' reaction to this failure, the Treasury Department issued
regulations imposing a limit on the tax savings that could be enjoyed through
the use of generation-skipping-exempt trusts located in states permitting the
trust to last indefinitely.3 However, it subsequently decided to delete from the
26 See I.R.C. § 2641 (1994) (creating a zero tax liability for a generation-skipping transfer where the
inclusion ratio is, as determined under I.R.C. § 2642, zero); id. § 2642 (making the inclusion ratio zero for a
transfer that is wholly exempt).
27 See Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST Tax: New
Perilsfor Practitionersand New Opportunities,30 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 185, 205-09 (1995).
28 Trusts designed to remain in existence for several generations (or longer) in order to maximize the
effectiveness of the generation-skipping-tax exemption are presently being created in the eight states that
have either abolished or substantially relaxed the rule against perpetuities: Alaska, Arizona, Delaware,
Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, South Dakota and Wisconsin. See Steven J. Oshins, Sales to Grantor Trusts:
Exponential Leverage Using Multiple InstallmentSales, PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 46, 51.
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 270, cmt. b. (permitting the trust settlor, as a
general rule, to designate which state's law is to govern the validity of the trust as long as the state has some
contact with the trust, such as the trustee's being domiciled in the state or trust assets' being located in the
state); Frederick R. Keydel, Revocable Trusts Revisited, 18 INST. ON EST. PLAN. I 1100, 1103.5, at 11-20
(1984) (permitting settlor to select governing law).
30 It is conceivable that non-tax considerations may be part of the motivation leading states to alter or
repeal the rule. For example, the rule has been criticzed on libertarian grounds. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS 304 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Propeny, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 667, 704-05, 710-13 (1986).
31 See Treas. Reg. § 26.2652-1(a)(4) (as amended in 1997). Under the regulation, a person exercising a
special power of appointment becomes the transferor of the appointed property for generation-skipping-tax
purposes if the effect of the exercise is to postpone vesting beyond the perpetuities period as measured from
the date of the creation of the power. Thus, if as a result of the exercise of a special power, vesting is deferred beyond the perpetuities period, the original transferor would no longer be viewed as the transferor. As
a consequence, even though the original transferor had made the trust fully generation-skipping-tax exempt
by allocating his or her exemption to it, the trust would no longer remain permanently exempt, unless the
person exercising the special power allocated his or her exemption to the trust as well. See id. In short, the
effect of the regulation was to eliminate the possibility of making a trust utilizing a special power of appointment permanently exempt through the allocation of the original transferor's exemption. See Pam H.
Schneider & Lloyd Leva Plaine, GenerationSkipping Final Regs. Cure Many (But Not All) of the Problems
in the Prop. Regs., Part11, 85 J. TAX'N 139 (1996). In promulgating this regulation, Treasury obviously
perceived that it was necessary to target special powers of appointment, for practitioners do not utilize general powers of appointment in trusts to which exemption is allocated, given that a general power would trig-
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regulations the exemption-limiting concept it had adopted initially. 32 Presently,
therefore, taxpayers throughout the country continue to create permanently
exempt trusts by locating them in states that no longer maintain the rule against
perpetuities. In implicitly relying on the rule against perpetuities under state
law, Congress in effect overemphasized state law and created the opportunity
for taxpayers locating their trust in the right state to enjoy a permanent

generation-skipping exemption. To remedy this, a federal rule limiting the
duration of exempt trusts, perhaps a rule similar to the one initially adopted by
the Treasury Department, would be necessary.
Another example under current law of an overemphasis on state law (and
the negative consequences of such overemphasis) arises in connection with
I.R.C. § 2704(b) ("section 2704(b)"). Under that section, certain restrictions
("applicable restrictions") imposed on the taxpayer's right to liquidate his or
her interest in an entity are disregarded for valuation purposes in the context of
intrafamilial transfers.33 So, for example, if a partnership agreement provides
that the general partner can neither force a liquidation of the partnership nor
require the partnership to liquidate his or her interest without the consent of all
of the other partners, the general partner's interest could be viewed as subject
to an applicable restriction, assuming all of the statutory conditions are satisfied.' Were it so viewed and were the general partner to die, the value of the
general partner's interest in the partnership would be determined for estate tax
purposes without regard to the restriction.35 In contrast, under conventional
valuation principles (i.e., in the absence of section 2704(b)), the amount included in the general partner's gross estate on account of the partnership interger inclusion in the power holder's estate under I.R.C. § 2041 and thereby defeat the objective of allocating
the exemption to the trust. I.R.C. § 2041 (1994). Also, for a trust designed to last indefinitely, the use of a
special power is necessary as a practical matter in order to avoid inflexibility. In any event, the exemptionlimiting provision in the regulations has been deleted. See T.D. 8720, 62 Fed. Reg. 27498 (1997) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R.), which is discussed infra at note 32.
32 See T.D. 8720, 62 Fed. Reg. 27498 (1997) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R.). Treasury deleted the exemption-limiting concept from the regulations apparently because of its concern that the concept would actually produce an inappropriate tax savings for taxpayers creating non-exempt generation-skipping trusts. In
the case of such trusts, if the holder of a special power were to exercise it in a way that postponed vesting
beyond the perpetuities period (as measured from the date of the power's creation), the power holder would
become the transferor under the approach initially adopted in the regulations. This could have the effect of
deferring the generation-skipping tax until a later generation, even though no portion of the trust would be
subject to tax in the power holder's estate. See Schneider & Plaine, supra note 31, at 145. Treasury's decision to delete the exemption-limiting concept may also be reflective of the concern that it was invalid because of an insufficient predicate in the statute. See id.at 139 n.5.
33 See I.R.C. § 2704(b)(1) (1994).
34 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(d) ex. 1 (1992).
35 See id.

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

est would be reduced to reflect the restriction on the ability to liquidate contained in the agreement. 6 In short, section 2704(b) produces a higher valuation.
The statute, 37 as amplified by the regulations," qualifies the applicablerestriction concept in an important way, defining the concept so that restrictions imposed under state or federal law as a default rule do not trigger the
section. In other words, only restrictions that deviate from the default rule can
be treated as applicable restrictions. Thus, if, in the example just posited, the
default rule under state partnership law were to the effect that no partner could
force a liquidation of the partnership (or the partner's interest) without the consent of all partners, the general partner's interest would not be viewed as subject to an applicable restriction. It would therefore be valued conventionally,
that is, by taking into account the restriction's depressant effect on value.
Conversely, if the default rule under state partnership law allowed a general
partner unilaterally to withdraw his or her capital at any time, the provision in
the agreement requiring the consent of all partners would be viewed as an applicable restriction and would be disregarded for valuation purposes (again assuming all of section 2704(b)'s requirements are satisfied).39 Seeking to exploit the section's reliance on the partnership or corporation law's default rule,
some states have enacted default rules that are favorable to taxpayers. 40 As a
36

See Estate of Watts v. Commissioner, 823 F. 483, 486-87 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that restriction

on general partner's right to force liquidation of partnership resulted in discount in valuing the partner's
interest for estate-tax purposes).
37 I.R.C. § 2704(b)(3)(B) (1994).
39 Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b) (1992).
39 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(c) (1992) (providing that where an applicable restriction is disregarded,
the transferred interest is valued under state law as if the restriction were not included in the entity's govering document).
40 As an example, consider the developments under section 2704(b) in connection with the right of a
partner to withdraw from the partnership. Under section 603 of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, a limited partner is entitled to withdraw from the partnership and receive "fair value" for his or her interest at any time, subject to a six-month waiting requirement. REVISED UNti. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 603
(amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 217-18 (1995). On the other hand, the section provides that this withdrawal
right is not available where the partnership agreement establishes a fixed date for the termination of the partnership. Id. The Internal Revenue Service maintains that section 603 establishes a default rule that permits
withdrawal at any time. Thus, according to the Service, a partnership agreement containing a fixed term
displaces the default rule, imposing an applicable restriction, within the meaning of section 2704(b), on the
right of the limited partners to liquidate their interests. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-42-003 (July 2, 1998);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-30-004 (July 25, 1997) (applicable restriction found because agreement contained a fixed
term); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-35-003 (Aug. 29, 1997) (holding restriction applicable because agreement explicitly
denied the right to withdraw at any time).
The Service's position, if sustained, would significantly undermine the discount-planning opportunities offered by the typical family limited partnership. In the typical plan, a substantial minority discount is
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consequence, taxpayers seeking valuation discounts are advised by practitioners to form their entities in states that have enacted taxpayer-friendly default
rules.4 ' As in the case of generation-skipping-exempt trusts, it would be preferable to42create a federal standard for determining the scope of acceptable tax
planning.
Tax-driven provisions in state law that result from the tax law's
overemphasis on state law are not based upon appropriate state-level policy
claimed in connection with the gift of the limited partnership interests. See generally James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L. REv. 415, 430 (1995). If the donee
can withdraw his or her capital at any time, little, if any, minority discount would be available (perhaps some
discount would be appropriate given the need to wait for six months before receiving the distribution). And
if section 603's withdrawal-at-any-time approach is negated by including a fixed term in the agreement, the
Service will invoke section 2704(b) and tax the gift as if the withdrawal right had not been displaced. See
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-30-004 (Apr. 3, 1997). Obviously aware that the Service was preparing to take this position on section 603 and the fixed-term agreement, various states have amended their partnership and/or LLC
statutes to include as a default rule a prohibition on the right of members or partners to withdraw voluntarily,
making it necessary to override the default rule in the governing document where the members or partners
prefer to retain the right to withdraw at any time. See Milford B. Hatcher, Jr. & Gregory E. Kniesel, Preferred Limited Partnerships-Nowthe FLPsof Choice, 89 J. TAX'N 325, 327 (1998); Steven T. Ledgerwood,
Oklahoma LLCs v. Limited Partnerships:Choice of Entity for Valuation Discounts After 1997, 22 OKLA.
CrrY U. L. REv. 611 (1997). Thus, a taxpayer seeking a minority discount for a limited partnership or similar interest would be well advised to consider forming the entity in a state that has adopted this new approach. It can also be anticipated that additional states will adopt similar legislation. See Lisa I. Fried,
Business Legislation:Bills Aim for Competitive EnvironmentHere, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 21, 1999, at 5 (indicating
that legislation has been proposed in New York that would change the default rule for LLC's - under which,
currently, a member can withdraw at will subject to a six-month waiting period-so that, unless the governing document provided otherwise, a member could not withdraw at will).
41 See Hatcher & Kniesel, supranote 40, at 327; Ledgerwood, supranote 40, at 638-39 (suggesting the
use of the Oklahoma LLC because of its favorable default rule).
42 Given the resourcefulness of practitioners in creating new value-depressing restrictions, it is not surprising that section 2704(b)(4) authorizes the Treasury Department to issue regulations directing that other
restrictions (presumably restrictions in addition to those defined in the statute as applicable restrictions) not
be taken into account for valuation purposes. I.R.C. § 2704(b)(4) (1994). It is not entirely clear, however,
that this subsection would authorize the Treasury to issue a regulation directing that a restriction embodied
in a state-law default rule be disregarded, because section 2704(b)(3)(B) indicates that a restriction that is
supplied by state law is not to be viewed as an applicable restriction. Id. § 2704(b)(3)(B). Perhaps the better
reading of the statute would permit a regulation disregarding a state-supplied default rule, for section
2704(b)(3)(B) merely creates an exception to the definition of applicable restrictions and does not appear to
constitute a limitation on the Treasury's authority under section 2704(b)(4). In any event, the only regulation thus far issued under section 2704(b) deals exclusively with applicable restrictions and makes clear that
a default rule under state law is not to be treated as an applicable restriction. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2
(1992).
Parenthetically, it has been suggested that the value of an interest, for transfer tax purposes, should be
deemed to be no less than its pro rata liquidation value (i.e., liquidation value determined without any minority discount). See William S. Blatt, Minority Discounts, FairMarket Value, and The Culture of Estate
Taxation, 52 TAx L. REv. 225, 263 (1997). Under this approach, all restrictions on the right to liquidate
would be made irrelevant when determining liquidation value. See id.
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considerations. Nor are they the product of the friction that state legislators
normally face in crafting legislation.43 Indeed, they are simply the product of
an unhealthy competition among the states to create a legal environment
conducive to taxpayers seeking to achieve federal tax savings. 44 When
43 It is also possible that an overemphasis could cause a state legislature to choose an outcome that it
would otherwise reject were it to focus exclusively on state-level concerns. So, for example, a legislature
considering the rule against perpetuities might, on balance, decide that its concern about encouraging an
appropriate level of risk-taking, see Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REV.
1867, 1869 (1986), outweighed its libertarian discomfort with the rule, see Epstein, supra note 30, at 703-07,
and that the rule should therefore be retained. Yet, when informed about the potential for generationskipping-tax savings, it might well decide in favor of repeal. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Significant Trends
in the Trust Law of the United States, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 531, 539 (1999) (suggesting that the taxinduced repeal of the rule is of "dubious policy merit").
Similarly, one could argue that, in the spendthrift context, the tax law's overemphasis on state law has
resulted in legislation that would not have been enacted if only legitimate state law concerns had been taken
into account. As a traditional matter, where a trustee is given discretion to make distributions to the grantor,
the grantor's creditors can reach the trust's assets. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2)
(permitting the creditors of the grantor to reach the trust's assets to the extent that, under a maximum exercise of discretion, the trustee could make distribution to the grantor). Applying the traditional rule, the
courts have held that, in the case of such a discretionary trust, the corpus must be included in the grantor's
estate (because of the grantor's indirect ability to gain access to the trust by undertaking debts that the trustee would be required to satisfy). See Estate of Paxton v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 785, 818 (1986) (holding a
discretionary trust includible in the grantor's estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) because the grantor's creditors
could reach the trust's assets under Washington law); Revenue Ruling 77-378, 1977-2 C.B. 348 (ruling that
a discretionary trust must be included in a grantor's estate under I.R.C. § 2038 where the grantor's creditors
could reach trust assets under state law). Recently, Alaska enacted legislation eliminating the traditional
rule. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (Michie 1998) (providing that a grantor can secure spendthrift protection with respect to his or her interest in the trust even though the trustee has the discretion to make distributions to the grantor). Delaware has enacted similar legislation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 351-376
(Supp. 1998). Thus, such a discretionary trust created under Alaska or Delaware law presumably would not
be included in the grantor's estate. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-37-007 (June 10, 1998) (transfer of property to a
trust under a statute like Alaska's constitutes a completed gift for gift tax purposes because, under the statute, the grantor's creditors could not reach the trust's assets, though it should be noted that the Service explicitly declined to rule on the includability of the trust corpus in the grantor's estate, perhaps because an
implied understanding between the trustee and the grantor that the trustee would make distributions to the
grantor would trigger inclusion under I.R.C. § 2036 without regard to the ability of the creditors to reach the
trust's assets. See id. It is inappropriate, however, to permit state law to be determinative in this fashion.
Whether the trust is created under Alaska law or under the law of a traditional state, it would seem that the
opportunity retained by the grantor to reacquire the corpus through the exercise of the trustee's discretion
should make the trust subject to tax in the grantor's estate. Cf. I.R.C. § 677 (1994) (making the grantor
subject to income tax on income that, in the discretion of the trustee, could be distributed to the grantor). In
sum, this overemphasis may well account for Alaska's, as well as Delaware's, abandonment of the traditional rule and the underlying concern for creditors' rights.
44 From a public-choice perspective, state legislation ought to be enacted where, after balancing
competing interests, it is determined that a societal benefit can be achieved (beyond the mere transfer of
wealth to a politically powerful group). See Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative
Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471, 477
(1988). In the case of an overemphasis, costs are incurred in securing the necessary state legislation, see id.
at 478 (discussing the deadweight social loss inherent in attempts to secure favorable legislation), even
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overemphasizing state law, Congress in effect abdicates its responsibility to
determine federal tax policy, allowing the states instead to control tax-policy
questions indirectly. Moreover, tax-driven provisions in state law produce
distortion, in that taxpayers are induced to engage in transactions that
otherwise would make no sense (e.g., a non-Alaskan resident contributing
property to a trust in Alaska and opting to have the trust property be treated as
community property in order to secure the advantages that section 1014 makes
available for community property).4 - Lastly, they create opportunities for
taxpayers with sophisticated counsel to take advantage of the tax system,
resulting in the inequity and tax-base distortions that such opportunities
normally generate. 46
In Part II, the question of overemphasis on state law in the context of the
marital deduction's passing requirement will be considered.
II. THE MARiTAL DEDUCTION: AN OVEREMPHASIS ON STATE LAW
A. Overview of the MaritalDeduction'sPassingRequirement
In 1948, in an attempt to create parity between couples living in common
law and community property states, Congress adopted the marital deduction. 47
Under the 1948 legislation, a spouse living in a common law state could
bequeath as much as half of his or her estate to the surviving spouse tax-free.48
This arrangement created parity with couples living in a community property
state, inasmuch as the 1948 legislation required only half of a spouse's
community property-i.e., the amount over which the decedent spouse had
testamentary contro1--to be included in his or her estate.50 The excluded half
though the sole purpose for the legislation is tax-based and the legislation will not lead to any societal
benefit.
45 See Mitchell M. Gans, GRIT's, GRAT's and GRUT's: Planning And Policy, 11 VA. TAX REV. 761,
812 (1992) (discussing distortion in the transfer-tax context).
46 Where the rules are susceptible to exploitation through sophisticated planning, inequity results because of the difference in tax burden imposed on taxpayers depending on whether or not they decide to engage in the favored transactions. See Gans, supra note 45, at 896 n.255 (suggesting a relationship between
distortion and inequity).
47 See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 361, 62 Stat. 110, 117-21 (1948); Surrey, supra note
23, at 1117-25.
48 A deduction was allowed for the amount passing to the surviving spouse, but the deduction could not
exceed fifty percent of the decedent's adjusted gross estate. See Surrey, supranote 23, at 1121.
49 See id.at 1118-25.
50 The 1948 legislation repealed prior legislation, enacted in 1942, and thereby re-enacted the pre-1942
rules. Under the 1942 legislation, in a community property state a husband (who was presumed to be the
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of the community property was viewed as belonging to the surviving spouse
and therefore not transferred from the decedent spouse to the surviving spouse.
Because the excluded half of the community property passed from the
decedent to the surviving spouse as a result of state law, and because the
objective underlying the marital deduction was to equalize the tax treatment of
common law and community property couples, the marital deduction was
naturally made applicable only where property passed from the decedent to the
spouse under state law.5 Thus, as enacted, the marital deduction would be
available, and is still available, only where the property passed from the
decedent to his or her spouse under state
law (either under the decedent's will
52
or by virtue of some other legal right).
Not only did the legislation provide that the property must pass to the surviving spouse in order to qualify for the deduction, but it also required, in effect, that the surviving spouse be the intended beneficiary. 3 This intent-based
aspect of the passing requirement was significant in the context of will-related
litigation and disclaimers.
In the case of will-related litigation, where a beneficiary other than the
surviving spouse surrendered part or all of the bequest to the surviving spouse
in a settlement, no deduction would be permitted for the surrendered portion
because the decedent spouse failed to express an intent that the surviving
spouse receive it.' Despite this failure, the deduction would nevertheless be
permitted if it could be established that the surviving spouse was entitled to the
surrendered bequest under state law." Thus, even though the amount
surrendered by the non-spouse beneficiary actually passed into the hands of
the spouse, no deduction would be available-unless the amount surrendered
reflected the allocation of rights called for under state law. 6
economic source of the property) was required to include all of the community property in his estate, except
to the extent that it could be proven that the community property was attributable to the efforts of his wife.
See id. at 1118.
51 See id. at 1125-27.
52 For the passing requirement under current law, see I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1994) and Treas. Reg.
§§ 20.2056(c)-i and 20.2056(c)-2 (as amended in 1994).
53 See Surrey, supra note 23, at 1126.
54 See Pub. L. No. 471, § 361(e)(3), 62 Stat. 110, 120 (1948); see also S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 4-5
(1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1226-27; Surrey, supranote 23, at 1126.
55 See S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 4, reprintedin 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1226.
56 Making a determination as to the allocation of rights under state law can, of course, be a complicated
issue. The Supreme Court eventually addressed the issue in Commissionerv. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456
(1967), and the lower courts, as well as the Service, continue to deal with it. For a further discussion, see
infra notes 78-125 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, where the spouse surrendered part or all of the bequest

to another beneficiary, the deduction would not be available irrespective of
state law, apparently because the surrendered amount did not actually pass into

the hands of the spouse.57 The deduction would be denied in these circumstances notwithstanding the fact that the decedent intended the spouse to re-

ceive the bequest. Even if it could be established that the spouse's right to retain the bequest was beyond challenge under state law, that would be of no
consequence."
In short, once
thelaw
surviving
surrendered
the bequest,
59 whereas
further
inquiry concerning
state
would spouse
be appropriate,
such no
an

57

See S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 4, reprintedin 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N at 1226.

58 See id.
59 The congressional decision, in 1948, to establish a per se rule denying the marital deduction for a
bequest surrendered by a surviving spouse is perhaps understandable. After all, once surrendered, the
amount bequeathed to the surviving spouse would not be included in the surviving spouse's estate. And it
was certainly not clear in 1948-indeed, it is not clear today-that the surrender of a bequest in the context
of settling a litigation would constitute a taxable gift. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 69 n.6 (1962)
(indicating that settlement occurring in the context of a divorce would not be viewed as triggering a taxable
gift absent specific provisions in the Code providing that the relinquishment of marital rights as between
spouses does not constitute adequate consideration for transfer-tax purposes); Harris v. Commissioner, 340
U.S. 106, 112 (1950) (indicating that settlement of litigation ordinarily does not result in a taxable gift by
virtue of the ordinary-course-of-business exception, which is now contained in Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8
(1992)); Estate of Friedman v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 714, 719-20 (1963) (holding that settlement agreement between surviving spouse and her stepchildren qualified under the ordinary-course-of-business exception and therefore did not result in a taxable gift); cf Revenue Ruling 77-314, 1977-2 C.B. 349 (indicating
that settlement agreed upon in order to avoid the cost and delay of litigation would be subject to gift tax). If
Congress had permitted the marital deduction for a bequest to the spouse that the spouse surrendered, it
might be possible for the surrendered portion to escape transfer tax entirely: it would not be subject to estate
tax in the decedent spouse's estate because of the marital deduction; it would not be subject to estate tax in
the surviving spouse's estate because it was transferred out of the estate; and, assuming the gift tax were not
applicable to the surrender of a bequest in the settlement context, no gift tax would be imposed on the surviving spouse.
Moreover, even assuming the surviving spouse's surrender of the bequest could have been viewed as
triggering a taxable gift, the resulting gift tax probably would not fully have offset the reduction in estate tax
attributable to allowing the marital deduction in the decedent spouse's estate. Prior to the unification in
1976 of the estate and gift taxes, the structure of the gift-tax system was such that an inter vivos gift
generally produced a significantly lower tax than the estate tax would produce on an identical testamentary
gift. See Theodore S. Sims, Timing Under a Unified Wealth Transfer Tax, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 34, 35 n.3
(1984). It should be noted, however, that Congress's decision to deny the marital deduction for a
surrendered bequest was, in all likelihood, not driven by a concern about the opportunity available to
taxpayers to exploit the discontinuity between the gift and estate tax systems. Rather, it was more likely
driven by its concern that a settlement-related surrender of a bequest would not be viewed as a taxable gift
and that therefore the surrendered bequest could pass into the children's, or another beneficiary's, hands
completely tax-free. See Schroeder v. United States, 924 F.2d 1547, 1554 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining that
Congress's decision to deny the marital deduction for a bequest surrendered by the surviving spouse makes
sense given the possibility that transfer tax could be avoided entirely if the rule were otherwise). Indeed, it
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inquiry would be appropriate in the case of a bequest surrendered to the
spouse.
In the case of disclaimers, the intent-based aspect of the passing requirement similarly precluded application of the marital deduction to a bequest surrendered by a non-spouse beneficiary to the surviving spouse by disclaimer,
° under state
even though the bequest actually
S °
61passed to the surviving spouse
law as a result of the disclaimer. Where it was the spouse who disclaimed a
bequest in favor of another beneficiary, the intent-based aspect of the passing
requirement presented no such difficulty. Nevertheless, the marital deduction
would not be available because the disclaimed portion did not actually pass
into the hands of the surviving spouse.62 Again, the deduction would be denied
even though the decedent intended that the surviving spouse receive the bequest.
Congress did not offer any explicit justification for imposing the intentbased aspect of the passing requirement. It would seem, however, that
Congress was concerned that a couple living in a common law state not be
treated preferentially relative to community property couples. And because, in
the case of a community property couple, the one-half exclusion rule applied
only where state law conferred the right on the surviving spouse to half of the
community property, it apparently made sense to Congress that no marital
deduction should be available in a common law state where the property
passed to the spouse only because of some post-death action voluntarily
undertaken by another (i.e., an action to which the spouse had no legal
entitlement at the time of the decedent's death).
In any event, in 1966, Congress revisited the intent-based aspect of the
passing requirement. In doing so, however, it focused solely on disclaimers

was not until 1976 that Congress first addressed the discontinuity between the gift and estate tax systems.
See Sims, supra,at 34-35.
While Congress's decision not to allow the marital deduction for a surrendered bequest was presumably based on its concern about the potential for tax avoidance, it may inadvertently have created the potential
for double taxation. Without the marital deduction, the decedent spouse's estate would be subject to tax on
the property bequeathed to the surviving spouse. And if, contrary to Congress' expectation, the Service
were successfully to impose the gift tax on a surviving spouse's surrender of a bequest to another beneficiary
(perhaps because the ordinary course of business exception were rendered inapplicable by the presence of
donative intent, see Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1992)), the property passing into the hands of that beneficiary
would be subject to double taxation.
60 See S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 4-5 (1948), reprintedin 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1226-27.
61 See infra Part IIJ for a further discussion of disclaimers.
62 See S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 4-5 (1948), reprintedin 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1226-27.
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and ignored will-related litigation. 6' Emphasizing that people often fail to
engage in adequate estate planning prior to death and that no policy favors
punishing the surviving family for the decedent's oversight, Congress
eliminated the intent-based aspect of the passing requirement insofar as it
applied to disclaimers. 64 Under the 1966 amendment, 6' disclaimers became
effective for marital deduction purposes when executed by a non-spouse
beneficiary, as well as by the surviving spouse. In other words, unlike the
approach adopted in 1948, if a non-spouse beneficiary disclaimed and the
disclaimed bequest passed as a result under state law to the surviving spouse,
the marital deduction would be available for the disclaimed portion. Thus,
insofar as disclaimers were concerned, Congress eliminated the intent-based
aspect of the passing requirement. In short, upon enactment of the 1966
legislation, property passing to a beneficiary as a result of a disclaimer,
whether the beneficiary was the spouse or a non-spouse, would be viewed as
passing directly from the decedent to that beneficiary for purposes of
determining the availability of the marital deduction.
While the rules concerning the elements of a valid disclaimer for marital6
deduction purposes, and for tax purposes generally, have changed since 1966,
the law remains that, for purposes of the marital deduction, disclaimers are to
be respected. The deduction is to be allowed for property passing into the
hands of the spouse under a disclaimer and, conversely, no deduction is to be
allowed for property so passing into the hands of a non-spouse beneficiary. 67
Unfortunately, however, with respect to will-related litigation, the intent-based
aspect of the passing requirement, as enacted in 1948, remains intact. As will
be argued, this aspect of the passing requirement constitutes an overemphasis
on state law and is indefensible from a tax policy perspective. Indeed, as will
also be argued, the passing requirement itself overemphasizes state law and
should be changed.

See S. REP. No. 89-1599, at 2 (1966), reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3112,3113.
64 See id.
63

65 See Technical Amendments Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-621, 80 Stat. 872 (amending I.R.C.
§ 2056(d) (1954)).
66 See infra Part L.
67 See infra PartIIJ.
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B. Will-Related Litigation: The Implementing Regulations and the Supreme
CourtDecision in Bosch
1. The Regulations

Faithful to the structure of the statute as enacted in 1948, the current
regulations68 take a bifurcated approach to the treatment of property transferred
in settlement of will-related litigation. First, they adopt a per se rule denying
the marital deduction where the surviving spouse surrenders a bequest in such
a settlement. 69 Consistent with the statutory scheme in place since 1948, the
deduction is denied without regard to the spouse's right under state law to
retain the bequest.70 This portion of the regulations simply effectuates
Congress's notion that the deduction should be permitted only for property
actually passing into the hands of the surviving spouse 7 and has created little
difficulty for the courts in its application. 2
68 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(d) (as amended in 1994).

See id. § 20.2056(c)-2(d)(1).
70 See Schroeder v. United States, 924 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1991); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 451 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971); United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1963);
Estate of Frost v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2101 (1993).
71 One court has held that the regulation does not go as far as the statute requires. In Schroeder, the
surviving spouse surrendered both an amount she would have been entitled to receive by statute and jointly
titled property passing to her by operation of law. 924 F.2d at 1554. Because, according to the court, the
regulation concerned only controversies related to the decedent's will, the regulation did not apply. See id.
Nonetheless, the court held that the marital deduction could not be permitted for the surrendered statutory
share and joint property because the statute itself contemplated a denial of the deduction where a surrender
occurred in connection with a dispute. The court emphasized the potential for tax avoidance were the statute
construed otherwise. See id.
72 The regulation is easy to apply in the sense that, unlike the rule applicable where a non-spouse
beneficiary surrenders in favor of the spouse, it does not permit any inquiry into state law. Moreover, while
it might be anticipated that the courts would have some difficulty in determining whether the spouse's
surrender of a bequest is part of a settlement (triggering the regulation and resulting in a denial of the
deduction) or a completely voluntary gift by the spouse (not triggering the regulation and not disqualifying
the bequest for the deduction), the courts have fashioned an approach designed to minimize such difficulty.
Concerned about the potential for tax avoidance inherent in a narrow construction of the regulation, see
supra note 71, the courts have avoided the difficulty of distinguishing between settlement and gift by
construing the regulation expansively and sweeping within it cases involving tranfers that might arguably be
viewed as gifts. See, e.g., Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1554; Citizens & Southern, 451 F.2d at 225-26; United
States Trust, 321 F.2d at 909-11.
Nevertheless, one could conceive of cases where the surrender of a bequest by the spouse could be
treated as a gift. To illustrate a gift and the consequences of treating it as such, assume the decedent
spouse's will contains a bequest to the surviving spouse of $1,000,000. If no dispute or litigation occurs
after the decedent's death and the surviving spouse decides to make a gift of, say, $200,000, it would seem
that the gift would not trigger the regulation and therefore would not disqualify the marital deduction. The
consequence of treating the transfer as a gift, rather than applying the regulation, could be significant. If the
regulation were applicable and the marital deduction denied for the surrendered portion of $200,000, that
69

1999]

FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXATION

Second, reflecting the intent-based aspect of the passing requirement, the
regulations provide that where a non-spouse beneficiary surrenders a bequest
in favor of the spouse as part of a settlement, the amount surrendered is not
necessarily viewed as passing to the spouse.73 They provide that the marital
deduction will be permitted with respect to the surrendered portion-in other
words, the surrendered portion will be regarded as passing to the spouse--only
if the surrender of property or rights to the spouse reflects "a bona fide recognition of enforceable rights of the surviving spouse in the decedent's estate."74
While the regulations go on to create a presumption in favor of such "bona fide
recognition" where there has been a determination by "a local court upon the
merits in an adversary proceeding following a genuine and active contest,"
they also indicate that a decree based on an agreement will not necessarily be
accepted as a "bona fide evaluation of the rights of the spouse." 75
This portion of the regulations, in contrast to the per se rule applicable
where the spouse surrenders a bequest,76 does not lend itself to easy application. Faced with the regulation's ambiguity concerning the level of deference
owed to a state court decree, the Supreme Court established a new framework
in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch.77 However, despite this new framework-indeed, because of it-uncertainty about tax consequences still hangs
over the settlement of will-related litigation, as well as decrees issued in such
litigation, where a bequest is surrendered in favor of the surviving spouse.

amount would be taxed immediately in the decedent spouse's estate, and at the estate's marginal tax bracket,
assuming it were not covered by the unified credit. As a gift, on the other hand, the surrender of the bequest
does not cause a reduction of the marital deduction. Instead, it produces a taxable gift for the surviving
spouse, taxed at the surviving spouse's marginal transfer-tax bracket (with no tax currently payable if the
surviving spouse' unified credit has not been fully utilized). See I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2503, 2505 (1994 & Supp.
IM 1997). For a case in which the family sought gift treatment for a surrendered bequest, see Estate of
Natkanski v. Commissioner,T.C.M. (CCH) 55 (1992) (denying the estate the marital deduction for a bequest
surrendered by the surviving spouse even though the surviving spouse reported the surrender as a taxable
gift). For a suggestion that the surviving spouse ought to be permitted to elect gift treatment in order to
avoid a forfeiture of the marital deduction in the decedent spouse's estate, see infra note 286 and
accompanying text.
73 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(d)(2) (as amended in 1994).
74 Id.

75 Id.

76 See supranote 72 and accompanying text.
77 387 U.S. 456 (1967).

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

2. The Bosch Framework
Because the availability of the marital deduction turns upon state law
where a bequest is surrendered in favor of the spouse, it becomes necessary to
consider how the federal courts should determine questions of state law. In
Bosch, the question arose in the context of a decree. After the decedent's
death, the family secured a state trial court decree conferring certain rights on
the surviving spouse that were critical in order for the estate to qualify for the
marital deduction. 8 If the Supreme Court had adopted the view that state trial
court decrees were determinative of the state law question resolved in the
decree, no further examination of state law would have been permitted by
either the Internal Revenue Service or the federal courts. And because the
state court decree conferred the necessary rights on the spouse, the estate
would have been entitled to the marital deduction.
The Court took a different approach, and established a new framework for
evaluating the federal tax consequences of state court decrees. It held that only
a decision by a state court of last resort would be entitled to binding
deference. 79 Borrowing the phrase from the 1948 Senate Finance Committee
Report, the Court held that a trial court or intermediate appellate court decree
would be entitled merely to "proper regard"'--thus permitting the Service and
the federal courts to examine independently the validity of the state court's
assessment of the spouse's rights.8

78

See id. at 458-59. The estate relied on I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) in claiming the marital deduction. Id. at

458. Under this section, which applies to transfers in trust for the benefit of surviving spouse, the spouse
must be given a general power of appointment for the transfer to qualify for the marital deduction. I.R.C. §
2056(b)(s) (1994). Because the spouse in Bosch had released the power, the availability of the deduction
turned upon the validity of the release. The state trial court had ruled that the release was invalid. Bosch,
387 U.S. at 459. In the companion case, Second National Bank v. United States, 351 F.2d 489 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 966 (1966), the deduction turned upon whether or not the marital gift was
encumbered by an obligation to pay a portion of the estate tax under a state tax-apportionment statute. 387
U.S. at 458-61. In that case, the state trial court had held that the marital gift was not subject to such an obligation, a decision that, if upheld, would result in a larger deduction. Id.
79 Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465.
go Id. (quoting the 1948 Senate Finance Committee Report for the proposition that "'proper regard,' not
finality, 'should be given to interpretations of the will' by state courts and then only when entered by a court
'in a bona fide adversary proceeding"'). In an effort to give content to the phrase "proper regard," the Court
indicated that an intermediate appellate decision ordinarily should be respected in the absence of convincing
or persuasive reasons indicating that the state's highest court would take a different view. See id. The Court
then went on to reason that, a fortiori, a state trial court decree should not be accepted as controlling in the
federal courts. See id.
" Id. at 465.
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Binding deference to a decision by a court of last resort is appropriate,
according to the Court, because there is no better authority on questions of
82
state law. In defending such deference, the Court made no explicit reference
to the notion that high-court decisions are more likely the product of a neutral
evaluation-that is, based solely on appropriate state law concerns and not on
the tax consequences that the parties would bear as a result of the decisionwhereas a lower court might be sympathetic to the family and therefore
inclined to adopt an approach that would result in a lower tax.13 Nevertheless,
it would seem that the implicit premise underlying the Court's decision to
require binding deference in the case of high-court decisions was the
conviction that such decisions ordinarily are not affected by the tax
consequences they might generate for the parties.8

82 Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the legislative history, de-emphasizing a regulation that appeared to take a contrary approach. See id. Ironically, were Bosch decided today, it would not be
surprising for the Court to engage in a different analysis, given the Court's increased willingness to defer to
regulations and its diminished enthusiasm for legislative history. See Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values,
66 Csi.-KENT L. REv. 365, 366 n.7 (1990); Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret Decline of Legislative History:
Has Someone Heard a Voice Crying in the Wilderness?, 1994 PuB. INT. L. REV. 57, 58; John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine,97 CoLuM. L. REv. 673, 679 n.3 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355-57 (1994) (all discussing the
Supreme Court's growing reluctance to rely on legislative history).
83 The majority explicitly rested its decision on three grounds: first, the legislative history underlying
the marital deduction contemplated that a state court decree would not be binding, even where the decree
had been the product of a "bona fide adversary proceeding"; second, Congress contemplated that the marital
deduction would be strictly construed so that the collection of revenue would not be jeopardized by
"loopholes" or "escape hatches"; and third, the rationale underlying the Court's decision in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), should apply in this context. Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464-65.
It is the contention of this Article that Bosch should be overruled by legislation. See infra Part Ill.
Because the first two grounds cited by the Court for its decision in Bosch merely reflect its perception of
congressional intent, they do not argue against such legislation. The third ground, while a policy-based concern, does not justify retaining the approach that the Court adopted. The rationale underlying Erie-concern
about forum shopping and the inequity it can produce, see Gasperini v. Center For Humanities, Inc., 518
U.S. 415, 416 (1996)-is not relevant, given that federal tax disputes are resolved only in the federal courts.
Nor can Bosch be justified by a concern about federal courts trampling on state law: a federal court resolving
a tax dispute does not, by determining a state-law issue in the course of reaching its ultimate tax conclusion,
trample upon state law in the same way that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction might were it
permitted to disregard state-court decisions. See Bernard Wolfman, Bosch, Its Implications and Aftermath:
The Effect of State Court Adjudications on Federal Tax Litigation, 3 INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 1 69.203 (1969)
(arguing that Erie rationale is not relevant in the Bosch context).
84 The validity of this assumption will be discussed infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
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C. Settlement Agreements: Good-Faith Compromise
About a year before the Supreme Court decided Bosch, the Internal
Revenue Service had issued Revenue Ruling 66-139."s In the ruling the
Service, after citing Lyeth v. Hoey,16 concluded that the amount passing to the
surviving spouse under a good-faith settlement agreement qualified for the
marital deduction. In Lyeth, the taxpayer had contested his grandmother's will
on the grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. The
taxpayer settled the contest and claimed that the settlement proceeds should be
excluded from his income as an inheritance under the predecessor of I.R.C.
§ 102 ("section 102"). The Court emphasized that had the contest not been
settled and had the taxpayer prevailed, the amount he would have received
would be excludible from income as an inheritance."' Concerned about
maintaining parity in tax consequence between a settlement and a verdict, the
Court held that the settlement amount should be treated as an excludible
inheritance. 8 Given the strong policy preference for voluntary settlements, the
Court's reluctance to create harsher tax consequences for a settlement than for

a verdict is certainly understandable.
In the ruling, the Service applied Lyeth, an income tax case, in the context
of the passing requirement without any discussion of the differences between
the estate tax and the income tax. In Lyeth, the settlement payment received
by the taxpayer could be viewed in one of three ways: as paid to the taxpayer
by the beneficiaries designated in the will solely because of their sympathy for
him; as paid to the taxpayer to avoid the cost of litigating his nuisance claim;
or as paid to the taxpayer in recognition of the strength of his legal claim.
While the Court expressed concern about-and then dismissed-the possibility that the taxpayer's claim was simply a nuisance suit, it did not discuss
whether the settlement payment was motivated by the beneficiaries' sympathy
or the strength of the taxpayer's claim. 9 In determining whether the taxpayer
85 1966-1 C.B. 225.
86 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
87 Id. at 195-96.
88 Id. at 196-97.
89 The Court ultimately concluded that, based upon the procedural posture of the case under state law at
the time of the settlement and the fact that the taxpayer indisputably had standing to contest the will, the
taxpayer did not have a mere nuisance claim. See id. at 195-97. Parenthetically, Lyeth has been invoked
even where the taxpayer's standing under state law to assert the settled claim was questionable. See, e.g.,
Howard v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 152, 156 (1971) (holding that consideration received in settlement of
taxpayer's dower rights were excludible under I.R.C. § 102 even though taxpayer's status as the decedent's
surviving spouse was in question).
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qualified for the exclusion under section 102, the Court appropriately avoided
any analysis of the beneficiaries' motivation. For, irrespective of the beneficiaries' motivation, the taxpayer would be entitled to exclude the settlement, as
an inheritance if it was based on the strength of the claim or as a gift if motivated by sympathy. 90
In contrast, where a settlement is reached with the decedent's spouse and
the marital deduction is sought for the settlement payment given to the spouse,
the inquiry is somewhat different. The question is whether the settlement
amount should be viewed as having passed from the decedent to the spouse.91
In answering this question, it would be helpful first to determine whether the
payment was made solely because of the beneficiary's sympathy for the
spouse or in recognition of the merit of the spouse's claim. In the former case,
it is fairly clear that the settlement amount passes to the spouse only because of
the beneficiary's volitional act and therefore should not be viewed as having
satisfied the statute's passing requirement. In the latter case, on the other hand,
the appropriate outcome under the statute is less clear. Some might argue that
a settlement payment cannot be viewed as satisfying the statute unless it is
established that the spouse's claim was enforceable and valid, whereas others
might argue that a settlement payment made on the basis of the beneficiary's
assessment of the claim's merit should be viewed as satisfying the statute and
that the claim's actual enforceability or validity should be irrelevant. In any
event, the Lyeth Court's tacit conclusion that it need not distinguish between a
sympathy-based and a merit-based settlement payment cannot easily be
integrated into the marital deduction's passing requirement.
While one might therefore question the Service's decision to invoke Lyeth
unqualifiedly in Revenue Ruling 66-139, the ruling makes clear that it does not
apply to a sympathy-based settlement. It does so by adopting a good-faith requirement, as did the Tax Court in Estate of Barrett v. Commissionert, which
the ruling also cites. In Barrett, the surviving husband, in anticipation of
litigation, entered into a settlement agreement with his wife's estate. The estate then sought to treat the settlement payment as qualifying for the marital
deduction. Relying on Lyeth, the Tax Court reasoned that because a payment
made to the husband pursuant to a state court decree issued after a fully litigated proceeding would qualify for the marital deduction, a settlement pay90 See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) (holding payments motivated by sympathy
excludible as a gift under section 102).
91 See supranotes 51-52 and accompanying text.
92 22 T.C. 606 (1954), acq., 1954-2 C.B 3.
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ment made to avoid such litigation should similarly qualify for the deduction.93
In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that the passing-requirement
regulations applicable to litigations and settlements 4 had been satisfied because of its finding of fact that the agreement had been reached in good faith
and in an arms-length setting,95 thus implying that a sympathy-based settlement
would not qualify for the deduction.
The Barrettcourt's premise that a payment made pursuant to a lower court
decree unquestionably would qualify for the deduction was swept away by the
Supreme Court's conclusion in Bosch that a lower state-court decree is entitled
only to "proper regard." And although the Court did not cite Barrett or Revenue Ruling 66-139--or the foundation underlying these authorities, Lyeth-its
holding in Bosch raised the question whether these authorities continued to be
viable.
D. Settlement Agreements: A Logical Extension of Bosch
After Bosch, the courts have held quite uniformly that where a non-spouse
surrenders property rights to the spouse under a settlement agreement, the
Bosch framework applies.96 This extension of Bosch into the settlementagreement context is a logical one, the rationale being that a settlement
agreement should receive no more deference than the state trial court decree at
issue in Bosch. Thus, under these post-Bosch decisions, the amount
surrendered to the spouse under a settlement agreement does not qualify for
the marital deduction unless it is established that the spouse had an enforceable
right under state law to the surrendered property at the time of the deceased
spouse's death.
In Ahmanson Foundation v. United States, 7 the Ninth Circuit held that
Revenue Ruling 66-139 was inconsistent with Bosch and therefore invalid."
9' Id. at 611.

94 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(d)(2) (as amended in 1994).
95 Barrett, 22 T.C. at 611.
96 See Estate of Carpenter v. Commissioner, 52 F.3d 1266, 1273 (4th Cir. 1995); Estate of Brandon v.
Commissioner, 828 F.2d 493, 499 (8th Cir. 1987); Ahmanson Foundation v. United States, 674 F.2d 761,
774 (9th Cir. 1981). But see Citizens & S. Nat'! Bank v. United States, 451 F.2d 221, 225 n.6 (5th Cir.
1971) (citing Barrettbut not Bosch and indicating in dictum that an agreement reached in good faith and in
an arms-length setting should be respected); Waldrup v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 820, 823-24 (N.D. Miss.
1980) (citing Barrett, Citizens & Southern, and Bosch, but not considering the applicability of the Bosch
framework in the context of a settlement agreement, and holding that whatever amount is received under a
settlement agreement qualifies for the deduction as long as the spouse asserted a valid claim).
97 674 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981).
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After reaching this conclusion, the court observed that Lyeth (the authority

upon which the ruling was based) could be viewed as both consistent and
inconsistent with Bosch.

They are consistent, according to Ahmanson, if

Bosch is read as contemplating that the level of deference owed to a settlement
agreement is identical to the level of deference owed to a decree, for the Lyeth
Court had emphasized the need to provide equivalent tax treatment for court
decrees and settlement agreements. 99 While Bosch itself did not address the
deference issue with respect to settlement agreements, the Ahmanson court
concluded that the Bosch Court could not have intended that settlement
agreements be given more deference than decrees.'00 In this sense, therefore,
Bosch and Lyeth are consistent. At the same time, however, Bosch and Lyeth
could be viewed as inconsistent in the sense that Bosch permits the Service to

examine independently a state lower court decree, whereas Lyeth would accept
such a decree as a dispositive resolution of state law issues.' ° '
This inconsistency could be resolved in one of two ways, according to
Ahmanson: first, Bosch could be read as applying solely to the transfer tax, or
even perhaps only in the more limited context of the marital deduction,'0 2 with
98 See id. at 774. The court went on to hold that the Service was not estopped by the ruling. See id.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court indicated that the Service is not bound by an erroneous interpretation in a
pro-taxpayer revenue ruling if the ruling would "overturn the plain language of a statute." Commissioner v.
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336 n.8 (1995). In light of Schleier, one certainly could argue that the "plain language" of I.R.C. § 2056 (1994 & Supp. 1111997) does not call for a result that is at odds with Revenue
Ruling 66-139 and that therefore the Ahmanson Court should have held the Service bound by the ruling.
99 674 F.2d at 774-75.
1oo Id. at 774 (citing Jonathan Sobeloff, Tax Effect of State Court Decisions: The Impact of Bosch, 21
TAX LAw. 507, 523 (1968)).
'0' See id. at 775.
102 It is worth noting that the issue before the court in Bosch concerned solely the marital deduction. In
resolving the issue, the Court anologized to the Erie doctrine, invoked the policies underlying that doctrine,
and discussed its perception that Congress intended the marital deduction to be strictly construed. Nevertheless, it placed heavy emphasis on the legislative history of the orginal 1948 marital deduction statute. See
Bosch, 387 U.S. at 463-65; see also supra note 82. Indeed, the Court borrowed the phrase "proper regard"
from the Committee Reports. See supra note 80. One might reasonably argue, therefore, that the Bosch
proper-regard standard should be applied only in the context of the marital deduction. Indeed, Ahmanson
intimated that Bosch could be read in this narrow fashion. 674 F.2d at 775. Some courts, however, have
extended the Bosch standard into other transfer-tax contexts. See, e.g., Estate of Dancy v. Commissioner,
872 F.2d 84, 85 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Bosch and examining state law to determine the validity of a disclaimer executed by the decedent's executor for purposes of determining whether the disclaimed interest was
includible in the decedent's estate); United States v. White, 853 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying Bosch
standard in connection with determining the amount of deductible administration expenses under section
2053); Estate of Stem v. Department of Treasury, No. IP 96-0694-C-T/G, 1998 WL 172640 (S.D. Ind. Jan.
5, 1998) (applying Bosch standard in connection with determining the validity of a claim against the estate
under I.R.C. § 2053); Estate of Hoenig v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 471,476 (1976). But see Estate of Warren
v. Commissioner, 981 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply the Bosch standard in the context of de-
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Lyeth remaining the controlling standard for all other tax purposes; second,
Bosch could be read as completely overruling Lyeth and establishing a new
standard applicable for both income and transfer tax purposes, under which
neither a lower-court decree nor a settlement agreement would be binding on
the Internal Revenue Service or the federal courts. t° Concluding that Revenue
Ruling 66-139 would not be valid under either of these alternatives, the
Ahmanson court refused to choose between them and simply declared the
ruling invalid, thereby leaving the inconsistency unresolved. 4
In post-Ahmanson decisions, the courts generally have applied the Bosch
standard in analyzing transfer-tax issues,0 5 while continuing to apply the Lyeth
standard in the context of the income tax.'0 6 As a practical matter, therefore,
the bifurcated approach inherent in the first alternative identified by the Ahmanson court has evolved, with greater deference being given to lower-court
decrees and settlement agreements in the income tax context'o° than in the
termining the amount of the charitable deduction under I.R.C. § 2055). The Service, as well, has applied
Bosch in transfer-tax contexts other than the marital deduction. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-28-012 (Apr. 13,
1995) (citing Bosch and Ahmanson and ruling that a family settlement agreement did not effect a taxable gift
and did not cause a trust created before September 25, 1985 to become subject to the generation-skipping
tax); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-08-032 (Feb. 26, 1993) (citing Bosch and Ahmanson and ruling that the surrender of
rights under a family settlement agreement constituted a taxable gift).
103 See Ahmanson, 674 F.2d at 775; see also George Craven, Tax Effect of State Court Decisions" The
Bosch Case,2 REAL PROP., PRoB. & TZ. J. 457,462 (1967).
104 674 F.2d at 774.
105 See supranote 102 and accompanying text.
106 The courts routinely cite Raytheon Production Corp. v Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 114 (lst Cir.
1944), which in turn relied on Lyeth, for the proposition that the nature of the claim surrendered in a
settlement should determine the income tax consequence. For additional discussion, see United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 237 (1992) (income tax consequence of damages received under settlement agreement
determined with reference to the nature of the claim settled). See also LeFleur v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M.
(CCH) 37 (1997) (indicating that the nature of the claim settled should be determinative and focusing on the
adversarial nature of the relationship between the parties); Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, Discrimination
Against Damagesfor Unlavful Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Income Tax, 35
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 447, 474 (1998) (indicating that Raytheon is the leading case on the income taxation of
damages received under a settlement).
107 It is, however, conceivable that the Bosch standard of review could be properly invoked in the context of an income tax issue. For example, in Brown v. United States, 890 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1989), the
Service took the position that the administration of an estate had been unduly prolonged and that therefore
the estate's income was taxable to the estate's beneficiary rather than to the estate during the extended period. The taxpayer had secured a state court decree to the effect that the administration had not been unduly
prolonged. See id. at 1341. The court held that Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1960) creates a federal standard
and that therefore the question whether an estate has been unduly prolonged presents a question of federal
law. See id. The state court decree, as well as Bosch, was entirely irrelevant to this analysis. See id. The
court simply had to decide whether or not the federal standard was satisfied. But the court went on to indicate in dictum that if the regulation had instead made state law determinative, then it would have been appropriate to review the state court decree under the Bosch standard. See id. at 1341-42. So while it is con-
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transfer-tax context (where the Bosch "proper regard" level of deference is invoked). 1 3
In Estate of Brandon v. Commissioner,'O where the Service invoked
Ahmanson, the surviving spouse elected to take a share of the deceased

spouse's estate under a dower statute. Because the dower statute was not
gender-neutral, its constitutionality was unclear.
Instead of litigating the question, the parties reached a settlement with the
surviving spouse receiving a sum of money. The estate then took the marital
deduction with respect to the settlement payment, which the Service disallowed. The Tax Court, citing Barrett, held that the payment satisfied the
passing requirement and therefore qualified for the marital deduction because
the settlement constituted a good faith compromise."°
Before the Eighth Circuit, the Service argued that the Tax Court had erred
in relying on Barrett."' Relying on Ahmanson, the court agreed with the
Service and held that Bosch had implicitly overruled Barrett."2 The court
remanded the case to the Tax Court for a determination whether the surviving

ceivable that Bosch could be applied in the income tax context where the tax law makes state law determinative, this does not suggest that Bosch could be applied in determining the income tax consequences of a settlement agreement. Ordinarily, in determining the income tax consequences of a settlement agreement, the
tax law does not make state law determinative. See, e.g., Lyeth, 305 U.S. at 194 (holding that whether
settlement was excludible as an inheritance was a question of federal, not state, law).
108 Some courts have taken the position that, in making the proper-regard inquiry, it is appropriate to
take into account the adversarial nature of the pre-decree or pre-agreement proceedings. See, e.g., Estate of
Delaune v. United States, 143 F.3d 995, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding adversarial nature of the proceedings relevant in determining whether state court decree is entitled to deference under Bosch); Estate of
Hubert v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 314 (1993) (despite citing Bosch and Ahmanson, the court nevertheless
indicated that the adversarial nature of the pre-agreement proceedings was relevant, although not controlling), affd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 93 (1997). Under such an approach to the proper-regard inquiry, the
Bosch and Lyeth standards would appear to be rather similar. It should be emphasized, however, that in
Bosch the majority refused to adopt the approach suggested by Justice Harlan, under which the state court
decree would have been entitled to binding deference if it was the product of adversarial proceedings.
Bosch, 387 U.S. at 481 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Thus, courts may be wrong to suggest that the majority in
Bosch contemplated that the adversarial nature of the proceedings would be relevant to the proper-regard
inquiry. Compare Hubert, 101 T.C. at 319-20 (stating that good faith settlements are relevant, but not
binding), with Estate of Carpenter v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2400, 2404-05 (1994) (citing Hubert
only for proposition that good faith settlements are "not binding"), aft'd,52 F.3d 1266 (4th Cir. 1995); see
generally Caron, supra note 2, at 824-32 (reviewing cases in which the courts have taken into account the
nonadversarial nature of the proceedings and pointing out that Bosch forecloses this approach).
1o9 828 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1987).
110 Estate of Brandon v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 327,335 (1986).
111 Brandon, 828 F.2d at493.
112 Id. at499.

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

spouse had a legally enforceable claim-i.e., whether the dower statute under
which the spouse asserted her claim was constitutional-at the time of the
decedent spouse's death.1 3 Thus, the Service successfully argued in Brandon,
on the basis of Ahmanson, that the settlement payment could qualify for the
marital deduction only if made in recognition of an enforceable 4state law claim
and that the good-faith nature of the settlement was irrelevant."
It is worth noting that, in Bosch, the state court decrees resolved questions
of law." 5 In contrast, Lyeth, Barrett and Revenue Ruling 66-139 concerned
settlement agreements that compromised claims where issues of fact had been
at stake.' 6 Although this law/fact distinction might be a basis on which these
authorities could be reconciled, the Service has not endorsed it. On the
contrary, the Service has taken the position that the Bosch framework is to be
utilized where questions of fact are involved, whether the issue has been
resolved by a state court decree" 7 or compromised by a settlement
agreement." Indeed, even the Ahmanson court, in remanding for possible fact
113 Id. at 500.

114 See also Estate of Carpenter v. Commissioner, 52 F.3d 1266, 1273 (4th Cir. 1995) (allowing the
Service to invoke Ahmanson).
115 In Bosch, the issue was whether the federal court was bound by the conclusion reached in the state
court decree that, as a matter of New York law, the donee of a general power of appointment did not have
the authority to release the power where the trust under which it was created was revocable and the grantor
was still alive. See 387 U.S. at 456-59. At issue in the companion case, Second NationalBank v. United
States, was the determination by the state court that the language of the decedent spouse's will was sufficiently ambiguous so as not to negate the operation of Connecticut's tax apportionment statute. See id. at
459-61.
116 In Lyeth, the settlement agreement compromised a claim based on allegations that the decedent's
will had been procured by undue influence and that the decedent had insufficient testamentary capacity. 305
U.S. at 189. In Revenue Ruling 66-139, the compromised claim had been based on allegations of impropriety in the execution of an antenuptial agreement. In Barrett, the compromised claim had been based on allegations of undue influence and impropriety in the execution of an antenuptial agreement. 22 T.C. at 606-08.
t17 See United States v. White, 853 F.2d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1988) (accepting the Service's argument
that the Bosch standard applies to a state court decree resolving a question of fact); Estate of Rowan v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 633, 638 (1970) (applying Bosch framework with respect to questions of fact). But
see Estate of Goree v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 123 (1994) (holding that a state trial court's finding
of fact is entitled to the same kind of deferential review it would receive in the state appellate court), action
on decision, 1996-001 (March 4, 1996) (nonacquiescence recommended by Service); Paul L. Caron, Tax
Court and Service Stake Out Positionsin State Law Debate, 71 TAX NoTEs 229 (1996) (arguing that federal
courts should review state court decisions for error, with the federal court giving the decision the same level
of deference that a state appellate court would be required to give it).
i'8 See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-30-003 (July 28, 1995) (denying the marital deduction for a settlement payment on the basis of the Bosch framework where the validity of the spouse's claim turned upon
whether or not the spouse had in fact murdered the decedent); Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-51-002 (Aug. 27, 1992)
(invoking Ahmanson and Bosch in connection with a settlement compromising claims concerning impropriety in the execution of an antenuptial agreement).
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finding, appeared to acknowledge that the Bosch framework should be utilized
to review the merits of a compromised claim even where questions of fact are
implicated." 9

Finally, although the Service refuses to revoke Revenue Ruling 66-139
explicitly, it has placed a gloss on the ruling that makes it consistent with
Ahmanson. In Revenue Ruling 83-107,'20 a post-Ahmanson ruling, the Service
sought to "clarify" Revenue Ruling 66-139. The ruling established a twopronged test that must be satisfied before the Service will accept a settlement
agreement: first, the amount surrendered to the spouse must be attributable to
an enforceable claim under state law; second, the settlement must constitute a
good faith compromise of the claim.2 This purportedly two-pronged test is
merely an adoption of Ahmanson in the first prong, with the second prong
being superfluous. If the spouse has an enforceable claim, any compromise
under which the spouse receives something of value necessarily will be viewed
as having been made in good faith to the extent of the value received.' 2 Thus,
under Revenue Ruling 83-107, an enforceable claim is both a necessary and a
sufficient condition in determining the availability of the marital deduction for
payments made under a settlement. Having made enforceability determinative,
the Service has in effect embraced the Ahmanson court's view of Revenue
Ruling 66-139 as invalid.' 3
19 See 674 F.2d at 775. See generally Wolfman, supranote 83,
the law/fact distinction).
120 1983-2 C.B. 159.
121 See id.

69.205.1, at 2-15 to 2-16 (discussing

122 If the spouse were to receive an amount less than what he or she would secure through enforcement
of the claim, the good faith nature of the compromise might be called into question, because the spouse
might surrender more than necessary to reach resolution. That, however, would not suggest that the amount
received by the spouse had been received other than through a good-faith settlement. But see Tech. Adv.
Mem. 92-51-002 (Dec. 18, 1992) (intimating that a settlement can be made in good faith even where the
spouse receives less in settlement than he or she would receive were the claim pursued).
123 While not acknowledging its inconsistency, the Service has, on occasion, accepted the allocation of
rights effected in a settlement agreement without considering whether the state court would have reached a
different resolution. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-45-015 (Aug. 7, 1998); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-33-017 (Mar. 8, 1996);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-10-018 (Dec. 7, 1995); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-47-003 (Aug. 5, 1993) (each involving a
settlement accepted by the Service for purposes of determining the marital deduction). When the Service
takes this approach, it emphasizes that the parties arrived at a settlement within a range of reasonable
outcomes that the state court might have chosen and/or that the settlement was made by the parties in good
faith, thus echoing Revenue Ruling 66-139 (as understood prior to the Service's clarification of the ruling in
Revenue Ruling 83-107). The Service's willingness to defer to the agreement reached by the parties is
understandable in light of the difficulties presented by trying to determine which of various plausible
outcomes the state's highest court would adopt. It is nevertheless surprising given that the Service takes the
position in litigation (as well as in Revenue Ruling 83-107 through the gloss placed on Revenue Ruling 66139) that the enforceability of the claim is determinative.
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In sum, Ahmanson and subsequent cases, particularly Brandon,'4 clarify
Bosch's significance in two respects. First, they logically extend the Bosch
framework so that it applies not solely to amounts received by the spouse under a decree, but also to amounts received under a settlement agreement. Second, they examine Bosch's scope and conclude that, while issues remain unresolved concerning Bosch's applicability in other tax contexts,'2 the Bosch
framework unquestionably applies in determining the availability of the marital deduction for a bequest surrendered in favor of the spouse.
As will be argued, the passing requirement, as embodied in the statute,
overemphasizes state law. Furthermore, the Bosch framework exacerbates this
overemphasis by choosing a construction of the statute that places even greater
emphasis on state law than other feasible constructions. But this critique of the
passing requirement, and of the Bosch construction, cannot be made without
first examining the changes in the marital deduction enacted by Congress in
1981.
E. The 1981 Legislation:Background
In 1981, Congress changed the marital deduction in two significant
respects, altering what will be referred to as the quantitative and qualitative
limitations it had created in the 1948 legislation. In making these changes,
Congress adopted a new model for the marital deduction, one with particularly
important implications in terms of the passing requirement. Yet Congress did
not address-indeed, it still has not addressed-these implications. Before
focusing on the 1981 changes, however, one must consider the 1948
legislation.
Under the quantitative limitation, the marital deduction could not exceed
half of the adjusted gross estate. 6 Under the qualitative limitation, a bequest
would qualify for the marital deduction only where the surviving spouse's interest was not terminable, the so-called "terminable interest" rule. 27

124 See also Estate of Carpenter v. Commissioner, 52 F.3d 1266, 1273 (4th Cir. 1995).
125 See supranotes 105-08 and accompanying text.
126 See Surrey, supra note 23, at 1121-22 (discussing the quantitative limitation and defining adjusted
gross estate as the gross estate less certain deductions and less community property, to make certain that the
marital deduction would not be permitted with respect to community property).
127 See id. at 1127-36. The terminable-interest rule is presently contained in I.R.C. § 2056(b) (1994 &
Supp. 11 1997).
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As previously discussed, the quantitative limitation was designed to place
couples residing in common law states in parity with those residing in
community property states.- Under the 1948 legislation, upon the death of a
spouse residing in a community property state, only half of the estate was
subject to tax. '29 In the absence of the marital deduction, the estate tax would
be imposed on the entire estate in the case of a spouse residing in a common
law state. 30 Under the marital deduction, however, a spouse residing in a
common law state could bequeath half of his or her estate to the other spouse
on a tax-free basis, thus creating parity between couples living in common law
and community property states."' As will be illustrated, the quantitative
limitation could produce3 2double taxation if the estate-planning documents were
not properly structured.
The qualitative limitation-the terminable-interest rule-also was based
upon a concern about parity.' In a community property state, the community
property excluded from the estate of the first spouse to die was, to the extent
not consumed, included in the estate of the surviving spouse.' 4 Parity required
that, in the case of a couple residing in a common law state, the marital
deduction be available only for a bequest that would necessarily result in estate
tax inclusion, to the extent not consumed, upon the death of the surviving
spouse. So, for example, whereas an outright bequest would satisfy the
terminable-interest rule because the bequest would trigger an inclusion in the
surviving spouse's estate, a bequest in trust providing the surviving spouse
with an income interest for life, and no power of disposition over the principal,
would not trigger such an inclusion and would therefore be ineligible for the
marital deduction.'
Given its objective, it would have been appropriate, indeed preferable, for
the terminable-interest rule to disqualify only those bequests not triggering an
inclusion in the surviving spouse's estate. The rule as drafted, however, was
overinclusive, disqualifying certain bequests even when they triggered an

128 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
129 See Surrey, supra note 23, at 1117-25.
130 See id.
131 See id.

132 See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
133 See Surrey, supra note 23, at 1127-28.
134 See id. And if the surviving spouse made an inter vivos gift of the property, the transfer would, of
course, be a taxable gift. See I.R.C. §§ 2501, 2503, 2505 (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
135 See Surrey, supra note 23, at 1128-29.
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inclusion in the surviving spouse's estate.13 To the extent that the marital
deduction 37was denied in the case of such a bequest, double taxation was
produced.1
Because, in the absence of proper planning, the quantitative and qualitative
limitations on the marital deduction could produce double taxation, they had a
substantial impact on the drafting of estate-planning documents. Typically, a
spouse inclined to bequeath his or her entire estate to the other spouse instead
would bequeath, because of a concern about double taxation, only half of the
estate to the spouse. The other half would be placed in a by-pass trust (a trust
that by its terms would preclude its corpus from being included in the
surviving spouse's estate). With such a plan, the couple's wealth would not be
subject to double taxation. Upon the death of the first spouse to die, half of his
or her estate would be bequeathed to the spouse and, by virtue of the marital
deduction, would not be subject to tax. Upon the surviving spouse's death, the
unconsumed balance of this bequest would be subject to estate tax. The other
half, placed in the by-pass trust, would be immediately subject to tax. Upon
the surviving spouse's death, no portion of the corpus of the by-pass trust
would be subject to tax.'3
To illustrate the double taxation that would occur if the documents were
drafted differently, assume the spouse in this example instead bequeathed the
entire estate to the other spouse. The marital deduction would be equal to half
of the estate (because of the quantitative limitation), and the other half would
be immediately subject to tax. Upon the death of the surviving spouse, the
136 In Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964), the Court held that a support allowance paid by the
estate to the surviving spouse did not qualify for the marital deduction. The fact that the amount paid to the
surviving spouse would ultimately be included in her estate was, according to the Court, of no consequence.
See id. at 509-10. In other words, the terminable-interest rule is applied to deny the deduction even where
the bequest will be subject to tax in the surviving spouse's estate. See also Howard E. Abrams, A Reevaluation of the Terminable Interest Rule, 39 TAX L. REV. 1, 16-18 (criticizing the terminable-interest rule because of its potential to produce double taxation).
137 Where a bequest made to a surviving spouse does not qualify for the marital deduction, double taxation results. The property is subject to tax in the decedent spouse's estate, and, to the extent not consumed
by the surviving spouse, it is subject to tax in the surviving spouse's estate as well. See Abrams, supra note
136, at 16-18.
138 To the extent that income or any corpus of the by-pass trust was distributed to the surviving spouse,
double taxation would result if the spouse did not consume the distributed property before death. As a
matter of planning, therefore, it is often recommended that the by-pass trust be made discretionary. While
double taxation could thereby be avoided, assuming that the trustee did not make any distributions to the
surviving spouse, this planning approach would disort the decedent's testamentary scheme, if one starts with
the assumption, as here, that the decedent was inclined to leave his or her entire estate to the surviving
spouse free of trust.
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entire amount of the bequest, to the extent not consumed, would be subject to

tax. Thus, the half of the estate not qualifying for the marital deduction would
be subject to tax twice-once in each spouse's estate.
To illustrate the overinclusive nature of the qualitative limitation and its

double-taxation potential, assume a spouse with children from a prior marriage
were concerned about providing for her children as well as her spouse. If such
a spouse bequeathed the entire estate in trust so that the income would be paid
to the surviving spouse and the remainder would be distributed to the children
upon the surviving spouse's death, double taxation would occur: no marital
deduction would be available because of the terminable-interest rule, and upon
the surviving spouse's death, all of the income received by the spouse from the
trust, to the extent not consumed, would be subject to tax."3 9
As these examples show, the quantitative and qualitative limitations not
only could produce double taxation but also had the effect of distorting estateplanning decisions. A donor inclined to give his or her entire estate to his or
her spouse was discouraged from doing so. At the same time, a donor inclined
to provide a bequest for his or her spouse in trust in order to protect the
donor's children from a prior marriage was discouraged from doing so. In
short, the marital-deduction concept that Congress created in 1948 was less
than entirely satisfactory, setting the stage for the 1981 legislation.
F. The 1981 Legislation
The 1981 legislation, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,40 was
enacted against a backdrop of changing attitudes concerning marriage and an
increasing rate in the incidence of divorce.14' From the feminist perspective
42
then becoming more prevalent, marriage was an economic partnership.

139 A marital deduction could have been secured if, under the trust, the surviving spouse were given an
income interest for life and a general power of appointment. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1994) (creating an
exception to the terminable-interest rule for a trust with such terms). However, the difficulty with a trust
containing a general power of appointment is that it would defeat the decedent spouse's purpose (to make
sure that, upon the surviving spouse's death, the principal would be distributed to the children from the prior
marriage) in that the surviving spouse would have complete control in selecting the appointees.
140 Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
141 It also was enacted against a political backdrop that was hostile to the transfer-tax system generally.
See Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1200
(1983) (indicating that President Reagan had argued throughout the 1980 campaign in favor of repealing the
transfer-tax system in its entirety).
142 See, e.g., Bea Ann Smith, The PartnershipTheory of Marriage:A Borrowed Solution Fails,68 TEiX.
L. REv. 689, 696-98 (1990) (discussing the partnership model of marriage and how it was fashioned to in-
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What this meant varied depending upon context. In the context of divorce, it
meant the adoption of equitable distribution statutes, under which marital
property would be divided at the time of divorce based upon various equitable
considerations and not on the manner in which the couple's assets were
titfed.' 43 In the transfer-tax context, it meant that it no longer made sense to
impose a transfer tax when one spouse died and the assets titled in his or her
name passed to the surviving spouse. After all, the transfer tax is designed to
impact people wealthy enough to have unconsumed resources at the time of
death.) 44 And if married couples were to be viewed as an economic partnership
or unit, it would be inappropriate to impose the tax on transfers within the unit
or before the death of both spouses. Upon the death of the surviving spouse,
to the extent that resources remained unconsumed, the tax then would be
imposed.146 In effect, the 1981 legislation eliminated the quanitative limitation
of the 1948 legislation on the principle that all of the assets titled in the name
of one spouse could be applied after his or her death to the consumption needs
of the other spouse without the imposition of the transfer tax. 147 As a
crease property distributions to women and to offset the economic losses sustained by women as a result of
divorce).
143 See id.,
144 See generally Michael J. Graetz, To Praisethe Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983)
(maintaining that the function of the transfer tax is to add progression to the income tax so that the tax burden is distributed on an ability-to-pay basis). In other words, the transfer tax can be viewed as an additional
layer of tax imposed on those who have an enhanced capacity to contribute to the cost of government-with
capacity being measured on the basis of resources remaining unconsumed at death.
145 See S. REP. 97-144, at 127 (1981), reprintedin 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 227-29.
146 le marital deduction gives spouses the opportunity to defer paying transfer tax until the death of
the survivor. The deferral, however, has a cost that tends to negate the value that deferral normally offers:
any bequest qualifying for the deduction ordinarily will produce a higher tax in the surviving spouse's estate
than the savings it generates in the decedent spouse's estate because income and appreciation accruing on
the bequeathed property during the surviving spouse's life must be included in the surviving spouse's estate.
See Jeffrey N. Pennell & R. Mark WiUiamson, The Economics of Prepaying Wealth Transfer Tax, TR. &
EST., June 1997, at 49.
147 Traditionally, during life one spouse could provide support for the other spouse without the
imposition of the transfer tax. See Estate of Glen v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 323, 335-6 (1966) (holding a
transfer in discharge of the obligation to support a spouse is not subject to transfer tax); cf. Estate of Rubin
v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 817 (1972) (finding payment made by decedent spouse's estate to surviving
spouse in discharge of a post-death support obligation does not qualify as a deduction under I.R.C. § 2053
and is therefore taxable). One can therefore view the enactment of the unlimited marital deduction as a postdeath extension of the notion that providing support for a spouse is not a taxable event. Recently, the
Treasury Department issued a proposed regulation in response to the decision in Commissioner v. Estate of
Hubert, 520 U.S. 93 (1997), which addressed the effect on the marital deduction of various estate
administration expenses. In doing so, it implicitly invoked the notion that the transfer of resources to the
surviving spouse for consumption purposes should not be subject to transfer tax. See Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)-4, 63 Fed. Reg. 69248 (1998). In the proposed regulation, Treasury takes the position that
where costs are incurred in managing investments during the estate administration of the spouse dying first
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consequence, a donor inclined to leave his or her entire estate to his or her
surviving spouse no longer would be subject to double taxation. This allowed
a donor to implement his or4 her estate plan free from the distortion inherent in
the quantitative limitation.
and the will imposes the burden of these costs on the gift made to the surviving spouse, the marital
deduction is not reduced by the amount of these costs. At first blush, it would appear that the regulation
inappropriately permits a double deduction for these costs: first, a marital deduction for the full amount of
the bequest to the spouse even though a portion of the bequest is used to pay these costs; and second, an
administrative expense deduction under I.R.C. § 2053 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997) (or a deduction on the
estate's income tax return under I.R.C. § 212 (1994), if executor elects to take an income tax deduction
instead of a section 2053 deduction). See Joseph M. Dodge, Lifting the Shroud ObscuringEstate of Hubert:
The Logic of the Income and Estate Tax Treatment of EstateAdministration Expenses, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 647
(1998) (suggesting that a double deduction for the same cost is made available if the marital deduction is not
reduced by the amount of administration expenses burdening the marital gift).
Nevertheless, upon more careful examination, it appears that the regulation reaches the correct result,
because investment management expenses incurred after the death of the first spouse should be viewed as a
consumption expenditure by the surviving spouse. Where a surviving spouse receives resources from the
deceased spouse and uses them for consumption purposes, transfer tax should not be imposed. The
regulation reaches this result by providing that the entire amount of the bequest to the spouse is deductible
under I.R.C. § 2056 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997), even though a portion of the bequest is to be used by the
spouse to pay for investment management expenses. In addition, an income tax deduction under I.R.C. §
212 should be permitted for the investment management expense, just as any person incurring such an
expenses would be entitled to an income tax deduction. Consider, for example, the case where a spouse
bequeaths money to the surviving spouse and the surviving spouse subsequently uses that money to pay a
medical expense. The entire amount bequeathed to the surviving spouse should qualify for the marital
deduction, and the surviving spouse should be able to take an income tax deduction for the medical expense
under I.R.C. § 213 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997). As is generally the case with respect to administration
expenses, however, the estate can elect to deduct them on the estate tax return under I.R.C. § 2053 instead of
as an income tax deduction under I.R.C. § 212. In other words, the estate can elect to surrender the income
tax deduction for an estate tax deduction-the effect of the election being to give the estate the benefit of the
deduction in the higher of its income- or estate-tax bracket. See Hubert, 520 U.S. at 140 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that in permitting the estate to take either an estate tax deduction under I.R.C. § 2053
or an income tax deduction under I.R.C. § 212, I.R.C. § 642(g) in effect permits the estate to enjoy the
deduction as against the higher of its estate- or income-tax brackets). See I.R.C. § 642(g) (1994 & Supp. III
1997). Thus, what appears at first blush to be an inappropriate double deduction proves to be an appropriate
double deduction, given the principle that transfer tax should not be imposed on the transfer of resources to
the surviving spouse for consumption purposes and the notion that consumption expenditures that would
ordinarily qualify for an income tax deduction should remain deductible in this context of inter-spousal
transfers.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that if the surviving spouse incurred an investment management
expense, the deduction for such an expense would be somewhat limited: it would constitute a miscellaneous
itemized deduction under I.R.C. § 67(b), making it subject to that section's two-percent rule and potentially
subject to the alternative minimum tax. See I.R.C. §§ 56(b)(1)(A), 67(b) (1994 & Supp. 1111997). Given
the limited nature of such a deduction, one might reasonably question the appropriateness of permitting a
full estate tax deduction under I.R.C. § 2053 for investment management expenses as an alternative to an
income tax deduction.
148 Unfortunately, however, a couple inclined to provide for each other on an outright basis still faces
distortion, albeit of a different kind. In order to protect the unified credit of the decedent spouse, it is
necessary to create in that spouse's will a so-called credit shelter (or by-pass) trust. See Gans, supra note 45,
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Sensitive to the increase in divorce and the estate-planning needs of
couples in second marriages, Congress modified the qualitative limitation as
well in 1981. Under this modification, a donor concerned about protecting
children from a prior marriage but nevertheless inclined to provide for his or
her spouse could create a trust that would accomplish these goals and still
qualify for the marital deduction. Congress achieved this by creating a new
exception to the terminable-interest rule, the so-called qualified terminable
interest property ("QTIP") exception, which permits a marital deduction for
property placed in a trust that meets certain requirements, including a
requirement that the trust principal be included in the surviving spouse's
estate. 149 Thus, second-marriage couples inclined to create a trust of this nature
no longer would be subjected to double taxation or discouraged from adopting
a plan of their choice by the potential for such taxation. 5
The changes in the quantitative and qualitative limitations share an
important common theme: as a general matter, the marital deduction now is
available as long as the unconsumed portion of the bequest is includible in the
surviving spouse's estate.15 ' Thus, the 1981 legislation effected a critical shift
away from the 1948 concern about maintaining parity between community-

at 812 n.108 (arguing that, in creating the need for a credit shelter trust, current law creates inappropriate
distortions).
149 See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (creating the exception); id. § 2044 (requiring inclusion in the surviving spouse's estate).
150 It is fair to say that the 1981 legislation is a reflection of conflicting impulses. On the one hand, the
legislation's elimination of the quantitative limitation is pro-feminist. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text. On the other hand, its QTIP provision has recently been the subject of criticism by feminist
scholars on the ground that it tends to encourage marital bequests to be made in trust rather than outright.
See Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers," 10 LAW & INEQ. J. 137, 156-59
(1991); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogicaland Degrading to Women, 5
UCLA WoMEN's L.J. 301, 305 (1995). But see Lawrence Zelenak, Taking CriticalTax Theory Seriously,76
N.C. L. REV. 1521, 1542-48 (1998). Moreover, by increasing the unified credit, the legislation induced
spouses to transfer more of their wealth to beneficiaries other than the spouse (either outright or in a credit
shelter trust). See Sims, supranote 59, at 37 n.12. This is problematic from a feminist perspective because
it creates an incentive to disinherit spouses at least partially, and, more generally, because it distorts. See id.
151 There are exceptions. Under current law, it is still possible for a bequest to be denied the marital
deduction and yet result in an inclusion in the surviving spouse's estate. For example, a trust mandating that
income be distributed to the spouse, but permitting invasions for the benefit of a non-spouse beneficiary
during the spouse's lifetime, would not qualify for a QTIP election (or the marital deduction). See I.R.C.
§ 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii) (1994 & Supp. 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-03-031 (Sept. 30, 1998) (denying the deduction in these circumstances). Yet the income distributed to the spouse must be included (if not consumed) in
the spouse's estate. See id.
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property and common-law couples 52 and toward a new model tying53 the
availability of the deduction to inclusion in the surviving spouse's estate.'
G. The New Model and State Law: In Conflict

Whereas it perhaps made sense in 1948 to require in the interest of parity
that, in the case of a couple residing in a common-law state, the property pass
under state law in order to qualify for the marital deduction,' 4 inquiries concerning state law should be inappropriate under the new model. Property
includible in the surviving spouse's estate should be deductible from the decedent spouse's estate. Whether the property finds its way into the surviving
spouse's hands by operation of state law or in some other fashion should be of
152 See supra Part II.A.

153 In its operation, the QTIP provision has not completely succeeded in implementing the 1981 model.
Recently, the courts have held that where a QTIP trust holds a minority interest in an entity, a minority discount should be taken into account in determining the amount includible under I.R.C. § 2044 in the surviving spouse's estate with respect to the trust. The courts have permitted the discount even where the QTIP
trust's interest in the entity and the interest in the entity otherwise owned by the spouse would constitute a
controlling interest were they viewed as an aggregate. See Estate of Bonner v. United States, 84 F.3d 196
(5th Cir. 1996); Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 26 (1999), action on decision, 1999-006
(Sept. 8, 1999). The result reached in these cases violates the 1981 model: in exchange for allowing the
marital deduction for a QTIP trust, the model requires the surviving spouse to include in his or her estate the
bequeathed property (together with the income and appreciation it generates) as if it were bequeathed to the
spouse outright. And if a minority interest in an entity were bequeathed outright to a spouse who otherwise
owned an interest in the entity as well, the two interests would be viewed as an aggregate and, if constituting
a controlling interest, would not be entitled to a minority discount. Thus, in permitting a minority discount
in these circumstances because a QTIP is used, the QTIP provision fails to implement the model. Legislation is necessary to remedy this failure.
There is a second context in which the QTIP provision may fail to implement the model fully.
Suppose, for example, that a QTIP election was made on the estate tax return of the decedent spouse.
Suppose further that the trust with respect to which the election was made was not eligible for QTIP
treatment but that the statute of limitations with respect to the decedent spouse's estate tax return runs before
the death of the surviving spouse. Does the deduction on the decedent spouse's return preclude the
surviving spouse's estate from arguing against inclusion? Or should the spouse's estate be permitted to
argue against inclusion on the ground that the trust was not eligible for QTIP treatment? If the spouse's
estate is permitted to argue against inclusion, the result violates the model: the marital deduction is allowed
in the decedent spouse's estate and inclusion in the surviving spouse's estate is avoided. While the Tax
Court initially concluded that the surviving spouse could argue against inclusion in such circumstances, see
Estate of Shelfer v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 10 (1994), rev'd. on other grounds, 86 F.3d 1045 (1lth Cir.
1996), it subsequently invoked the duty-of-consistency doctrine and precluded the surviving spouse's estate
from making the argument. See Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 290 (1997). To protect the
integrity of the model, legislation should be enacted to make certain that, where the deduction is permitted in
the decedent spouse's estate, inclusion is mandatory in the surviving spouse's estate. Legislation that would
achieve this result has recently been proposed by the Treasury Department. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, EscROW FUNDS AND OTHER SIMILAR FUNDs, 64 Fed. Reg. 4801-01 (1999) (to be codified at 26
C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed Feb. 1, 1999).
154 See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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no consequence, as long as any unconsumed portion will be subject to estate
tax at the death of the surviving spouse.
While the 1981 change in the quantitative limitation did diminish the importance of title 55--just as the equitable distribution laws then being enacted in
various states made title less relevant for divorce purposes 16-Congress did
not alter the role of state law that it had established for the marital deduction in
1948. Congress apparently perceived no disjunction between its new model
and the passing requirement's state-law component. There is, however, a tension between the two. Where property owned by the decedent spouse actually
passes into the hands of the surviving spouse other than by virtue of state law,
application of the new model would indicate that the marital deduction still
should be available because the property eventually will be included in the
surviving spouse's estate, if it is not consumed beforehand. But, because of
the passing requirement's state-law component, no deduction is permitted in
these circumstances.
Given the shift away from the concern about parity, there is no longer any
justification for the passing requirement and its reliance on state law. In retaining it, Congress struck the wrong balance, creating an overemphasis on
state law and, concomitantly, an underemphasis on relevant tax policy considerations. As previously suggested, whenever the balance is improperly struck
in favor of state law, distortion in the tax base occurs, equity violations result
and state law begins to be shaped by inappropriate policy considerations." 7
To illustrate, assume a husband ("H") and wife ("W") were married for
several years before W's death. W had been previously married and had a
child ("C") in her first marriage. W has died, and her will gives her entire
155 Prior to the 1981 amendment, title was much more important than it is now. On the death of a
spouse, the tax was determined based on the assets titled in his or her name. And even though all of the assets were bequeathed to the surviving spouse, a tax could still be due because of the quantitative limitation.
Thus, the tax liability was dependent upon the total value of assets that had been titled in the name of the
decedent spouse. In contrast, under the 1981 legislation, as long as a sufficient portion of the assets pass to
the surviving spouse, no tax is due--even if all of the couple's assets had been titled in the decedent
spouse's name. The legislation, moreover, eliminated the difficult task under prior law of determining the
source of the funds used to acquire the assets. See Gerzog, supranote 150, at 310 n.30.
Nevertheless, the manner in which assets are titled can still affect a couple's tax liability. Assume, for
example, that the wife has $1,200,000 of assets titled in her name and that the husband has no assets titled in
his name. If the husband should die first, a tax will be due at the time of the wife's death. If, however, half
of the couple's assets were titled in each spouse's name, no tax would be due on either spouse's death
because each spouse's unified credit would offset the tax incurred. I.R.C. § 2010 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
156 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
157 See supra Part I.B.
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estate to H. Under W's prior will, H was to receive only the minimum amount
required by state law. Even though the later will is invalid because it was not
executed in accordance with the statute of wills of State Y (where H and W
resided), C and H enter into an agreement under which H is to receive the
entire estate. As a result, H will receive $500,000 more than he would have
received under the prior will. The Service determines that the later will was
not properly executed and that therefore the $500,000 sum received by H
under the agreement does not qualify for the marital deduction.'58 The Service
also determines that C has made a taxable gift of $500,000 to H.' 9
Because the $500,000 sum does not pass to H under W's will or under state
law, the passing requirement is not satisfied and the Service's position will be
sustained. This will cause the $500,000 sum to be taxable in W's estate. If H
should consume this money during his lifetime, it will not be subject to tax in
his estate. But the tax imposed on the $500,000 sum in W's estate produces a
violation of the principle that the application of one spouse's resources to the
consumption needs of the other should not be subject to transfer tax. '6 If, on
the other hand, H should die without having consumed this money, it will be
subject to a second tax in his estate. In either case, the tax base, which,
normatively, is determined on the premises that a married couple constitutes a
single economic unit and that the couple's aggregate unconsumed resources
should be taxed only when they are transferred out of the unit,16 has been
distorted. And treating C as having made a taxable gift on the movement of
W's resources to H similarly will distort the tax base in that, normatively, no

158 Under the Service's current analysis, the marital deduction would be denied on these facts because it
does not have an enforceable claim under state law. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. It is
assumed that the agreement between C and H does not constitute a valid disclaimer under I.R.C. § 2518.
This could be the case for a variety of reasons: the agreement might be made more than nine months after the
decedent's death; under state law, as a result of C's disclaimer, the disclaimed interest might pass to C's
child, who is unwilling to disclaim in turn the interest she would acquire as a result of C's disclaimer, thus
preventing the disclaimed interest from passing to H; prior to entering into the agreement, C might have
taken some action effecting an acceptance of the interest; or C might have received under the agreement with
H a consideration that would taint the disclaimer. See infranote 265.
159 See, e.g., Estate of DePaoli v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1493 (holding that where property
passes from child to surviving spouse under family settlement agreement that does not constitute a valid
disclaimer, the child is deemed to have made a taxable gift), rev'd on other grounds, 62 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir.
1995); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-08-033 (Nov. 30, 1998) (ruling that child who consents to a court decree and
thereby surrenders a remainder interest in a QTIP trust to his or her parent makes a taxable gift); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 93-08-032 (Nov. 30, 1992) (ruling that surrender of rights under a family settlement agreement constitutes a taxable gift).
160 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
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transfer tax is imposed on a couple's resources as long as they remain within
the unit.
Closely related to distortion in the tax base is the resulting inequity. To
illustrate, consider another wife ("WI") and husband ("HI"), a couple
identically situated to W and H except that W1 and H1 reside in State X and
that Wl's will, while executed in the same fashion as W's, complies with the
statute of wills in State X. Wl's estate will be entitled to the marital deduction
for the full amount passing to Hi. As a result, none of the resources passing
from W1 to H1 that are consumed by H1 will be subject to transfer tax. Nor
will any of the couple's resources be subject to double taxation: all of the
couple's resources remaining unconsumed in Hl's estate will be subject to tax
at that time. And child ("Ci") will not be treated as having made a taxable gift
of $500,000 to Hi. In contrast, in the case of W and H, the denial of the
marital deduction will lead either to the imposition of a tax on the transfer of
W's resources to H, even though H uses those resources to meet his consumption needs, or to double taxation if the resources remain unconsumed-or
perhaps even to triple taxation if C's taxable gift is taken into account.162
H. Overemphasis: Can the Resulting DiscriminationBe Justified?
From the viewpoint of equity, one must ask whether the differences between these two couples warrant the substantial difference in tax outcome. In
other words, can the discrimination between these couples be justified as a
matter of tax policy?
1. Integrity of the Tax Base
The discrimination cannot be justified in terms of the need to maintain the
integrity of the tax base. As indicated, as long as a tax is imposed whenever
resources are transferred outside of the marital unit, the system works properly
63
and the structural integrity of the tax base is not violated or distorted.1
Because the movement of W's resources to H after W's death through C as an
intermediary does not result in any of the couple's resources moving outside of
the unit, there is no structural need for a tax to be imposed at W's death. As is
always the case, either the surviving spouse, in this case H, will consume the
162 Triple taxation would occur as follows: 1) upon the death of W, an estate tax would be imposed on
the $500,000 sum; 2) C then would be subject to gift tax on this sum; and 3) upon the death of H, the same
funds, to the extent unconsumed, would be subject to a third level of tax.
163 See supranotes 142-48 and accompanying text.
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resources, in which case no tax will be imposed, or the unconsumed resources
will be taxable upon his subsequent death. The integrity of the tax base
therefore is not maintained, but rather is violated, by the denial of the marital
deduction to W's estate and the resulting double, or even triple, taxation
imposed on the same assets.' 4
2. The Snapshot Conception of the Estate Tax
The discrimination also cannot be justified on the ground that estate-tax
theory requires that post-death events be ignored. It is true that, as a general
rule, the estate tax is based on a snapshot view of the estate taken on the date
into account.
of death and that post-death events typically are not taken
Given that the estate tax applies to transfers made at death, it makes sense to
require that the transfer be measured at the moment of death and that events
occurring after death be excluded from its calculus. Some might argue that the
passing requirement serves the valuable function of implementing the snapshot
conception of the estate tax in the marital-deduction context. In other words,
the availability of the marital deduction, the argument goes, should be
determined with reference to the surviving spouse's entitlement to participate
in the estate at the moment of death without regard to any post-death events.
Thus, if the spouse is entitled to receive a particular amount under the
deceased spouse's will or under state law because of his or her status as a
surviving spouse, the entitlement accrues at the moment of death and the
amount passing to the spouse qualifies for the deduction. But if the spouse
receives an interest in the estate because a beneficiary under the will makes a
post-death gift of it to the spouse, the spouse's entitlement does not accrue
until after death and therefore the deduction should not be available.

See supranote 162.
165 See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 507 (1964) (deciding that support allowance for
surviving spouse did not qualify for the marital deduction because the nature of surviving spouse's interest
was not determinable as of the decedent's death); Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 155
(1929) (finding that value of charitable remainder interest had to be determined based on life tenant's life
expectancy at the time of decedent's death even though life tenant in fact died shortly after decedent's
death); Estate of MeClatchy v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that selection of
executor should be ignored in determining value of gross estate even where decedent's selection caused the
value of an asset to increase from the value it had in the decedent's hands); Propstra v. United States, 680
F.2d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that post-death events should be ignored in determining the deductibility of claims against the estate under I.R.C. § 2053 unless the claim had been uncertain or disputed at
the time of death); United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that the value for the
interest that passes is determined as of the moment of death).
164
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The snapshot conception of the estate tax is not, however, a rigid one. It is
rather, as noted, a general rule, subject to exceptions where appropriate. In a
variety of contexts, post-death events are taken into account in determining the
taxable estate under present law.'66 The question, therefore, is whether in any
given context it is appropriate to permit an exception.
In the context of the marital deduction and its passing requirement, there
has been from the outset a willingness to permit exceptions where doing so
would result in disallowing or reducing the deduction. Under the 1948 legislation, as well as under current law, the deduction is not available where the
surviving spouse disclaims the bequest or surrenders it in settling a will contest. '67 Presumably, the deduction is denied in these two cases on two grounds:
first, the disclaimer or the settlement would ordinarily occur not long after the
deceased spouse's death and could therefore be taken into account without
much practical difficulty; second, the deduction should not be allowed if, ultimately, the bequest to the surviving spouse is rendered inoperative.

166 Post-death fluctuations in value are taken into account if the executor elects alternate valuation. See
I.R.C. § 2032 (1994). The deduction for funeral and administration expenses under I.R.C. § 2053 (1994 &
Supp. 1111997) is determined by the amount of expenses actually incurred and therefore depends upon postdeath events. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1972). Whether administrative expenses are
deducted on the decedent's estate tax return under I.R.C. § 2053 or on the estate's income tax return under
I.R.C. § 212 is a matter of election by the executor. See I.R.C. § 642(g) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). In determining the deductibility of claims against the decedent's estate under I.R.C. § 2053, post-death events are
taken into account where the claim is unmatured, contingent, or contested at the time of death. See Estate of
Smith v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 412, 419 (1997). Casualty losses occurring during the administration of
the estate are deductible under I.R.C. § 2054. See Estate of Meriano, 142 F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 1998). Disclaimers under I.R.C. § 2518, see infra notes 198-234 and accompanying text, QTIP elections (under I.R.C.
§ 2056(b)(7)) and the creation of a trust by a non-citizen surviving spouse in order to qualify for the marital
deduction under I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2)(B), all take into account post-death events. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7),
(d)(2)(B); 2518 (1994 & Supp. HI 1997). Finally, it has been suggested that a provision in a will directing
the executor to destroy an asset should be taken into account and that the gross estate should be reduced as a
result. See Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1981). Perhaps this approach
makes sense inasmuch as the decedent's destruction of the asset at any moment before death would eliminate the asset from the gross estate. Why, in other words, should the destruction of the asset by the executor
immediately after the death produce a different tax result? If the asset is destroyed, whether before death or
immediately thereafter, it does not pass to any of the decedent's beneficiaries and therefore no transfer has
occurred. On the other hand, it could be argued that a distinction must be made between pre- and post-death
destruction. Pre-death destruction is in the nature of consumption, and assets consumed pre-death are excluded from the tax base, whereas assets remaining unconsumed at death and destroyed thereafter cannot be
viewed as consumption and should therefore be included in the tax base. See Dodge, supra note 147, at 662
nn.64 & 66 (suggesting that post-death destruction of the decedent's assets should not result in exclusion
from the gross estate).
167 See supra notes 60-62, 68-72 and accompanying text.
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Over time, additional exceptions have been made that permit the marital
deduction to be increased on the basis of post-death events. As indicated
earlier, under the 1948 legislation, a disclaimer by a non-spouse that resulted
in property passing to the spouse would not be taken into account in
determining the amount of the deduction. But, in 1966, the Code was
amended to require that such a disclaimer be recognized as valid for purposes
of the deduction."9
More recently, the Internal Revenue Service took the position that the
terms of a QTIP trust must be examined at the moment of death to determine if
the statutory conditions for making an election have been satisfied. Based on
this, the Service maintained that it would not permit the deduction in the case
of a so-called contingent QTIP trust. 169 In other words, if the terms of the trust
required the payment of income to the spouse only if the QTIP election were
made by the executor (i.e., if the terms of the trust were in effect contingent
upon the election), the trust would not be eligible for the deduction because the
terms of the trust would not satisfy the statute until the executor made the
The courts, however, rather uniformly rejected the Service's
election 7
position.' The courts apparently recognized that it would not violate policy to
permit the deduction in these circumstances, inasmuch as treating the QTIP
election as valid results in all of the trust's income and corpus being subject to
tax 7 2 in the surviving spouse's estate 3 (or subject to gift tax if the surviving
spouse makes a transfer during life).

74

In the face of these defeats, the Service

altered its position to permit the deduction for contingent QTIP trusts.7' Thus,
168 See supranotes 63-65 and accompanying text.
169 The Service made this argument in several cases. See Estate of Spencer v. Commissioner, 43 F.3d
226 (6th Cir. 1995); Estate of Robertson v. Commissioner, 15 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1994); Estate of Clayton v.
Commissioner, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992); Estate of Clack v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 131 (1996).
170 See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii) (1994) (providing that an election can only be made if, under the terms
of the trust, the spouse is entitled to all of the trust's income and no person is authorized to distribute trust
assets to a non-spouse beneficiary during the spouse's life).
171 The Tax Court initially upheld the Service's position in a few decisions. See Estate of Spencer v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 937 (1992), rev'd, 43 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 1995); Estate of Robertson v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 678 (1992), rev'd, 15 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 1994); Estate of Clayton v. Commissioner,
97 T.C. 327 (1991), rev'd, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992). However, it overruled those decisions after the
Circuit Courts of Appeals all took a contrary position. See Estate of Clack v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 131
(1996).
172 See Estate of Rinaldi v. United States, 38 Fed. Cf. 341,347-8 (1997) (explaining Robertson, Clayton,
and Spenceron this basis).
173 See I.R.C. § 2044 (1994).
'74 See id. § 2519.
175 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(d)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1999) (permitting an election for a contingent QTIP trust).
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under current law, even though the terms of the trust are subject to post-death
alteration by the executor, the deduction is allowed if the executor makes the
QTIP election and, as a result, the right to receive income from the trust passes
to the spouse. 6
Similarly, in the case of the marital deduction where the surviving spouse
is not a United States citizen, the snapshot conception is not rigidly applied.
To make certain that any amount passing to a non-citizen spouse ultimately
will be subject to transfer tax, the Code was amended in 1986 to provide that
the marital deduction will not be available unless the bequest is made under a
trust containing certain terms.' The statute, however, explicitly provides that
if the will fails to create such a trust but instead makes an outright bequest to
the spouse, the required trust (a qualified domestic trust or "QDOT") can be
created by the surviving spouse after the decedent spouse's death.'
In
permitting the spouse to satisfy the statute by making a post-death alteration in
the nature of the bequest, Congress apparently took the view that it was not
necessary to apply the snapshot conception in this context. In other words, as
long as the trust structure is in place to make certain that the non-citizen spouse
will in fact pay tax on any transfer of property received from the deceased
spouse, the deduction can be made available without regard to whether the
trust structure is created before or after death.
In each of these cases--disclaimers, will-contest settlements, contingent
QTIP trusts, and postmortem QDOT trusts created by non-citizen spousesthe determination as to whether an interest has passed to the surviving spouse
is made on the basis of post-death events. In each of these cases the
availability of the marital deduction depends upon whether the spouse actually
receives the decedent's property, rather than upon the legal nature of the
spouse's rights in the decedent's estate at the moment of death. If the spouse's
actual receipt is determinative, the integrity of the tax base is maintained in
that the deduction is available only for property that will be subject to tax upon
176 Of course, the trust terms must otherwise satisfy the statutory conditions for making a QTIP election.
See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997). Thus, even though the election will result in the spouse's
becoming entitled to receive all trust income, the deduction will not be permitted where, for example, the
trustee is given the discretion to invade for the benefit of someone other than the spouse during the spouse's
lifetime. See id. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I) (providing that a power to appoint any part of the property to a nonspouse during the spouse's lifetime renders the trust ineligible for QTIP treatment); Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(b)-7(d)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1999) (providing that an election can be made with respect to a contingent QTIP trust as long as the terms of the trust otherwise satisfy the statute's conditions).
177 See I.R.C. § 2056A (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
178 See I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2)(B) (1994).
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the spouse's later death (or earlier gift). In other words, because the integrity
of the tax base is not violated, the system comfortably can take into account
post-death adjustments in the amount passing to the spouse.
The discrimination between the two hypothesized couples, therefore,
cannot be justified on the theory that the snapshot conception is somehow
intrinsic to the estate tax and must be rigidly followed in all cases. On the
contrary, just as post-death events are taken into account in order to determine
the availability of the marital deduction in each of the cases discussed above,
so, too, should the fact that W's $500,000 bequest actually passes to H as a
result of C's post-death gift be taken into account in determining the
availability of the marital deduction in W's estate.
3. Variationin State Law as a Justification
The discrimination outlined above 1 79 cannot be justified by pointing to the
difference in state law. W could have been more diligent in complying with
the statute of wills in State Y, or could have secured more competent counsel,
in which case W's estate would be entitled to a full marital deduction and no
Thus, at bottom, the discrimination is
discrimination would occur.8
attributable to the fact that W, unlike W1, was careless in executing her will,
rather than to any difference in state law.
4. CarelessPlanning
Nor can the discrimination be justified on the ground that it tends to make
people more careful in their planning. As will be argued,"' concerns about
inducing more careful planning do not warrant the imposition of a post-death
penalty in the form of a greater transfer-tax liability. Before considering this
argument, however, it should be acknowledged that encouraging people to do
more careful planning is not an illegitimate goal. The statute of wills, for
example, has been justified, in part, on the ground that its ceremonial
requirements impress upon the testator the significance of the will-execution
And, as a matter of
act and thereby tend to discourage carelessness.
179 See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.

180 Nor would the possibility of double (or triple) taxation arise, as C would not be treated as having
made a taxable gift to H.
181 See infranotes 185-93 and accompanying text.
182 See, e.g., Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classificationof Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE
U. 1, 5-6 (1941) (indicating that one function of the statute of wills, the so-called ritualistic function, is to
avoid giving legal effect to a careless act on the part of the testator).
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traditional doctrine, the statute of wills is enforced through the post-death
penalty of denying probate to the will. 3 Similarly, under traditional doctrine,
the state courts have been unwilling to cure mistakes made by the testator or
the testator's counsel-though this reluctance has not been explicitly justified
on the ground that it would induce testators to be more careful.'94
The traditional unwillingness to provide post-death relief for pre-death
carelessness is not, however, without limits. Even under the most traditional
approach, courts generally will respect an agreement among surviving family
members effecting the distribution of an estate, even though the dispositive
85
scheme embodied in the agreement differs from that selected by the testator.
In upholding these family settlement agreements, the courts emphasize the
value of family harmony and the potential for enhancing such harmony by
voluntary settlement. 6 Disclaimers are another tool that state law-as well as
the tax law "n-traditionally has recognized in order to permit post-death
adjustments to a failed plan.'
Recently, the severe consequences that
traditional doctrine can produce also have been the subject of substantial
criticism."' Under the evolving approach, it is no longer appropriate to impose
a harsh penalty on the decedent's family-such as denying probate or refusing
to cure a mistake-merely because the decedent was careless or the decedent's
counsel was unsophisticated. "°
183 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Error in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia'sTranquil Revolution in Probate,87 CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1987).
184 See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake:
Change in Directionin American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982).
185 See, e.g., Martin D. Begleiter, Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to Send the Final
Threat, 26 ARIz. ST. L.J. 629, 642 (1994) (indicating that, under the family settlement doctrine, beneficiaries
are able to distribute the estate as they choose); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of ContractInterpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1710, 1723-4 (1997) (indicating that family settlement
agreements are liberally construed because they serve a valuable function); M.L. Cross, Annotation, Family
Settlement of Testator's Estate, 29 A.L.R.3d 8, 97-98 (1970).
186 See, e.g., Wolf v. Uhlemann, 158 N.E. 334, 340 (111.1927); In re Gustafson, 551 N.W.2d 312, 314
(Iowa 1996); In re Estate of Stancik, 301 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. 1973).
187 )While the tax law long has recognized as a general matter the validity of disclaimers, see, e.g.,
Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), the marital deduction could not be enhanced through a
disclaimer until 1966. See supranotes 63-65 and accompanying text.
188 See Joan B. Ellsworth, On Disclaimers:Let's Renounce I.R.C. Section 2518, 38 VILL. L. REv. 693,
757 (1993) (indicating that disclaimers are available in order to permit the family to rectify mistakes in predeath planning).
189 See Langbein, supra note 183, at 3-8 (criticizing the strict-compliance aspect of the statute of wills);
see generally Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 184 (criticizing the traditional reluctance to grant relief for
mistakes made in the drafting of wills).

190 See, e.g., In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991) (embracing the doctrine of substantial
compliance in connection with will executions); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw OF PROPERTY:
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The more forgiving approach now evolving, as well as the traditional willingness to accept family settlement agreements and disclaimers, obviously reflects discomfort with a policy requiring the family to suffer on account of the
decedent's carelessness or mistake. Such discomfort is understandable for
several reasons. First, mistakes in planning potentially occur more often when
done under the supervision of unsophisticated counsel. If the law fails to provide a post-death remedy for these pre-death mistakes, the family is required to
suffer the consequences simply because the decedent selected the wrong counsel. Second, while the goal of encouraging people to engage in careful predeath planning may be a legitimate one, the question remains whether it is a
sufficiently important goal to warrant the imposition of a post-death penalty on
the family. Third, even assuming the goal is of sufficient importance, it is
doubtful that post-death penalties can be effective in helping to achieve the
goal, for people often have difficulty in confronting their own death and in
making arrangements for it.' 91 Moreover, given that the penalty is not imposed
immediately, but rather after death, it is not very likely that the possibility of
triggering the penalty will have any impact on behavior." 2 Finally, there is a
sense of injustice when rules impose a penalty on one person for the act or
conduct of another.' 9a Thus, while the goal of encouraging people to be more

careful in their planning is a legitimate one, it does not justify the post-death
penalty of increased transfer-tax liability.
In short, given the absence of any policy-based justification, the discrimination between the two couples should not, as a matter of equity, be tolerated.
L Overemphasis: OtherNegative Consequences
In addition to inequity and distortion in the tax base, the passing
requirement's overemphasis on state law can lead to the formulation of state
law on the basis of considerations not relevant to any legitimate area of state
concern. For example, various state courts have held, in construing wills and
trusts, that ambiguous provisions should be interpreted presumptively in a

DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995) (suggesting that relief be granted for mistakes in
the drafting of wills where there is clear and convincing evidence as to the testator's intent).
191 See SIGMUND FREUD, Our Attitude TowardDeath, in 4 COLLECrED PAPERS 304 (1925).
192 See Gerald M. Brannon, Death Taxes in a Structure of ProgressiveTaxes, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 451,45152 (1973) (arguing that the obligation to pay estate tax has a less significant impact on behavior than the
obligation to pay income tax because the estate tax is postponed until death).
193 See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 466-68 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that it
is fundamentally unfair to punish a person for a wrong committed by another).
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manner that will produce a lesser tax liability.' 94 While even those courts
adopting this interpretative strategy may impose limits on its use,' it seems
fairly clear that, when they do invoke it, they are motivated by a desire to
minimize the family's tax burden.1 6 This kind of tax-driven state law is not
only the outcome of a defective lawmaking process,19 but also leads,
ultimately, to more inequity. Identically situated taxpayers will be treated
differently simply because they reside in different states if, as has happened,
different approaches evolve in those states on the question of whether and
under what circumstances tax-minimization presumptions should be utilized.1 98
In the example just considered, depending on whether State Y adopted such a
presumption, W's earlier will might be construed as giving her entire estate to
H, thereby permitting a full marital deduction and eliminating W's estate tax
liability. However one comes out on the question of the appropriateness of
tax-minimization presumptions in general, there should be no serious dispute
about the necessity for taking the question out of the states' domain and
making it the subject of a uniform federal rule.
Ironically, the Bosch framework inexorably leads to validation of taxminimization presumptions. Under Bosch, any state rule adopted by the state's
highest court is binding on the federal courts as well as on the Service."' By
implication, any rule adopted by the state legislature is similarly entitled to

194 See, e.g., Simches v. Simches, 671 N.E.2d 1226, 1229-30 (Mass. 1996) (granting reformation of an

instrument on the ground that it would achieve the settlor's tax-minimization objectives); In re Branigan,
609 A.2d 431, 436-38 (N.J. 1992) (granting reformation of will, under doctrine of probable intent, in order
to give effect to the testator's imputed intent to minimize taxes); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1995) (permitting modification of an instrument so that tax savings can be achieved, even where reformation with respect to a non-tax issue would
be denied); Marilyn G. Ordover & Charles F. Gibbs, Correcting Mistakes in Wills and Trusts, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 6, 1998, at 3 (indicating that, in New York, a two-tiered approach has evolved, under which the courts
are much more inclined to correct mistakes that would result in higher taxes than they are to grant relief for
other kinds of mistakes).
195 See Branigan, 609 A.2d at 438 (embracing tax-minimization strategy in dictum, but refusing to
reform power of appointment when doing so would change substantive provisions of will).
196 In New York, for example, a two-tiered approach to construction has evolved. See Ordover &
Gibbs, supra note 194, at 3. Generally, the courts are unwilling to reform wills, but where doing so will
result in a tax savings for the family, they are much more sympathetic. See id.
197 See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
198 CompareIn re Lewis, 544 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sur. Ct. 1989) (reforming an instrument to confer a general
power of appointment on a beneficiary in order to reduce taxes) with Branigan,609 A.2d at 438 (citing and
disagreeing with Leivis).
199 If one of the alternatives suggested by this Article were adopted, see infra Part III, there would no
longer be a need for such a presumption.
200 See supranotes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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binding deference.m' Thus, where a tax-minimization presumption is adopted,
whether by a state court or by a state legislature, Bosch requires that it be given
binding deference.
However, this outcome undermines the apparent purpose of the Bosch

framework, which was to eliminate tax-driven state court decrees by requiring
neutral evaluation of state law for transfer-tax purposes. Neutral evaluation
was to be achieved, first, by making lower state-court decrees subject to
independent examination in the federal courts, thereby making certain that they

reflect an accurate assessment of state law, and, second, by obligating the
federal courts to respect a decision of the state's highest court, on the
assumption that such decisions are always based on appropriate state concerns
and never based on tax considerations. Apparently, when Bosch was decided,
the Court did not foresee that its neutral-evaluation framework could
ultimately legitimize efforts by state high courts and legislatures to enact

purely tax-driven tax-minimization presumptions.M

Another negative consequence that flows from the overemphasis on state
law arises in the context of post-death settlement agreements. While the law
generally favors the voluntary settlement of controversies2o -- and while this is

particularly so in the context of intra-family disputes -application
Bosch framework, as extended

to settlement agreements, 20

of the

creates a

disincentive to settle. Compromise is more easily achieved where the parties
have complete information about the after-tax costs that would be incurred and
the after-tax gains that would be secured through settlement.201 Thus, the
201 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21522(a) (West 1991) (providing that a marital bequest should be
construed so as to preserve the marital deduction).
202 Nor, apparently, did the Court foresee that a state's highest court might be willing to grant a decree

on the parties' consent for the purpose of achieving a particular tax outcome. See Simches v. Simches, 671
N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (1996) (granting reformation in order to reduce taxes where all parties consented to the
relief sought).
203 Voluntary settlements result in lower transaction costs. Also, the sense of coercion experienced by
the losing party in a litigation is avoided by settlement. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J 950, 956-58 (1979) (discussing the
benefits of voluntary settlement in the context of divorce litigation).
204 See id.; see also supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
205 See supra Part II.D.
206 Uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff or defendant will prevail at trial tends to impede the settlement process. See Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty,and Selection Bias in Litigation, 1993 U. Cm. L. Scn. ROU rDTAmtE
75, 93 (acknowledging that many take the position that uncertainty
decreases the likelihood of settlement, but indicating that it could increase the likelihood of settlement if the
parties are risk averse); Barry Nalebuff, Credible PretrialNegotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198, 207 (1987)
('The reason pretrial negotiation might not lead to settlement is the uncertainty about the value of going to
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parties to a dispute over the amount that the surviving spouse is entitled to
receive may well find compromise more difficult to achieve because of their
concern that the Service (and ultimately the federal courts) will conclude that
the settlement amount is more than the spouse would have received under a
proper interpretation of state law.
In addition, where the Service uses the Bosch framework to challenge a
settlement, the very issues the parties sought to avoid litigating in the state
court must be litigated in the federal court by the estate and the Service. The
cost of such litigation will be borne not merely by the estate, but by the public
as well though the use of judicial resources. The approach therefore
necessarily produces more transaction costs than would a rule requiring the
Service to accept the settlement. At a time when the transfer tax is under
attack on the ground that it is too costly to administerm such transactions costs
become a particularly relevant concern.
Moreover, where the Service successfully invokes the Bosch framework,
double taxation results--as is true whenever application of the passing requirement leads to a denial of the marital deduction for property actually
passing into the surviving spouse's hands. 2'0 Any property received by the
surviving spouse that does not qualify for the marital deduction in the decedent
spouse's estate because of a failure to satisfy the Bosch framework is nevertheless subject to tax again in the surviving spouse's estate, to the extent not
consumed.
Finally, it is worth noting that the approach adopted by the Court in Bosch
compounds the statute's overemphasis on state law. Had the approach
suggested by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion been adopted instead,
court."); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J. LEoAL STUD. 1,
9-17 (1984) (arguing that uncertainty reduces the likelihood of settlement). Similarly, it would seem that the
specter of an uncertain tax consequence could complicate the settlement process and ultimately lead to fewer
settlements.
207 In the discussions concerning the 1997 amendments to the Code, the argument was made that transfer taxation should be abolished, in part because of the high costs incurred in its administration. See, e.g.,
Martin A. Sullivan, The Estate Tax: Just the Facts,TAx NoES TODAY, Apr. 15, 1997, at 72-15, available in
LEXIS TNT file (arguing against the transfer tax system because of the high cost incurred in its administration). But see Charles Davenport & J.E. Soled, Enlivening The Death-Tax Death-Talk, 84 TAX NOTEs 591,
618-25 (1999) (arguing that the costs of administering the system have been overstated).
208 Where the Service uses the Bosch framework to challenge a state court decree, the re-litigation of the
issue in the federal courts also produces transaction costs that could be avoided were the Service required to
accept the state court decree.
209 It is also conceivable that triple taxation could result. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
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whatever conclusions a state court reached in the context of a genuinely
adversarial proceeding would be entitled to binding deference. 21 ' Had the
approach suggested by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion been adopted,
any conclusion reached by a state court-whether or not the result of a
genuinely adversarial proceeding-would generally be entitled to binding
deference. 212 In contrast, under the majority approach, state court conclusions
are not binding unless rendered by the state's highest court.213 Thus, because it
permits a state court's determination of state law to be relitigated in federal
court, the majority approach permits a denial of the marital deduction on the
basis of a state-law argument in a greater number of cases than would Justice
Harlan's or Justice Douglas's approach. In short, the statute itself overemphasizes state law, and the Bosch majority's construction of the statute, in
giving state law a more important role than it would have under other possible
constructions, makes a bad statute even worse.214
In sum, the passing requirement, as well as the Bosch framework, overemphasizes state law. The resulting discrimination between couples similarly
situated cannot be justified.2 " And the double (or perhaps triple) taxation that
the overemphasis can produce violates the model Congress created in 1981
tying the deduction to inclusion in the surviving spouse's estate.
J. Disclaimers:An Adjunct to the PassingRequirement
Any discussion of the passing requirement necessarily requires an
examination of disclaimers. Disclaimers serve, in effect, as an adjunct to the
216
passing requirement.
Indeed, from its inception, the marital deduction
statute gave limited recognition to disclaimers, 217 and in 1966 Congress gave
Under current law, a disclaimed
them full recognition in this context.
211
212
213
214

See Bosch, 387 U.S. at 481 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 470-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 465 (majority opinion).
Bosch's compounding of the statute's overemphasis on state law is exacerbated by expansion of the

majority approach in Bosch to settlement agreements. See supraPart U.D.
215 The grounds offered by the Court as justification for its decision do not justify retaining the framework. See supra note 83.
216 Disclaimers also are used in tax contexts having nothing to do with the marital deduction. To take
just one example, consider a decedent who bequeaths her entire estate to her only child and therefore fails to
use the generation skipping tax exemption provided by I.R.C. § 2631 (1994 & Supp. Im 1997). The child
could, in effect, resurrect the exemption by a disclaimer. See Ellsworth, supranote 188, at 753.
217 See Pub. L. No. 471, § 361(e)(4), 62 Stat. 110, 121 (1948); see also supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
218 See supranotes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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bequest is treated for transfer-tax purposes 19 (including the marital
deduction) m as if it did not pass to the disclaimant but rather to the person to
whom it passes as a result of the disclaimer. In permitting the decedent's
family a post-death opportunity to alter the estate plan and the amount of the
marital deduction, disclaimers introduce an element of flexibility into what
would otherwise be a very rigid passing requirement. Disclaimers, however,
have not entirely eliminated the difficulties created by the passing
requirement's overemphasis on state law. This is not surprising, inasmuch as
the Code's disclaimer provision itself overemphasizes state disclaimer law. As
the overemphasis on state disclaimer law has diminished over the years,
disclaimers unfortunately have become, as a byproduct, less effective as a tool
in helping to achieve the settlement of estate-related litigation. Most
significantly, despite the progress made, current tax-disclaimer law still places
too much emphasis on state disclaimer law.
1. Pre-1958DisclaimerLaw
In seeking to create parity between common-law and community-property
states in the 1948 legislation, Congress adopted the passing requirement and,
in so doing, made state law determinative as a general matter. 22' Thus, the
marital deduction was available only if the bequest passed to the surviving
spouse pursuant to state law or under a provision in the deceased spouse's will
that was valid under state law. Remaining faithful to this framework,
Congress embraced the state-law concept of disclaimers, at least in part, by
providing that a disclaimer by a surviving spouse, if valid under state law,
would be respected for purposes of the marital deduction. This provision
adopted for marital-deduction purposes the state law fiction that a disclaimed
bequest passes directly from the decedent to the person receiving the bequest
as a result of the disclaimer. m Thus, if a spouse disclaimed a bequest
contained in the deceased spouse's will, no marital deduction would be
allowed. 22 ' This provision created two options for a surviving spouse who was
entitled to a bequest under the deceased spouse's will but who wanted to
exclude the bequeathed property from his or her estate. By disclaiming the
bequest, the surviving spouse could nullify the marital deduction in the
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-1 (as amended in 1999).
See Treas. Reg. § 20-2056(d)-2(a) (as amended in 1997).
221 See supra Part II.A.
222 See Surrey, supra note 23, at 1126.
223 See id.
219

220
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deceased spouse's estate and concomitantly cause the bequeathed property to

be excluded from his or her own estate;224 alternatively, the surviving spouse
could accept the bequeathed property and then, in order to prevent
it from
22
it.
of
gift
vivos
inter
an
make
estate,
her
or
his
in
being included
The 1948 legislation did not, however, accept state law as determinative in
all contexts. Indeed, in two instances, Congress specified that state law should

be completely ignored. First, if a non-spouse beneficiary disclaimed a bequest
and, as result, the disclaimed bequest passed to the surviving spouse under

state law, the bequest would not be treated as passing to the surviving spouse
and the marital deduction would not be allowed.2 6 The marital deduction, in
other words, was denied even though, as a matter of state law, the bequest was
viewed as passing directly from the deceased spouse to the surviving spouse.
Second, if the surviving spouse surrendered a bequest in connection with a
controversy or litigation relating to the deceased spouse's will, the bequest
again would be treated as not passing to the spouse and the deduction again
would be unavailable.22 7 Thus, a bequest surrendered by a surviving spouse in
order to settle a will contest would not qualify for the marital deduction even if
it could be established through a Bosch-type neutral evaluation 28 that the
bequest was valid under state law.22 9 In both cases, the consequence of
rejecting state law was the denial of the marital deduction.
224
225

See id.
The estate and gift tax systems were not unified until the Tax Reform Act of 1976. See Tax Reform

Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-48 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.); see also Sims, supranote 59, at 34-35. Thus, in 1948, an inter vivos gift would not be included in
the calculation of the donor's estate tax as an adjusted taxable gift (the adjusted-taxable-gift concept, embodied in I.R.C. § 2001(b) (1994), was enacted in 1976 in order to implement unification of the two tax
systems). With the gift tax rates' being equal to 75% of the estate-tax rates and the lack of any connection
between the two tax systems permitting the donor of an inter vivos gift to enjoy entry-level brackets in computing the gift tax, transfer-tax savings could be achieved even more so than under current law by making an
inter vivos gift. See Sims, supra note 59, at 41 n.33.
226 See Surrey, supranote 23, at 1126 n.108.
227 See S. REP. No. 80-1013, at 4-5 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1226-27. This remains the rule under current law. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1994).
228 Bosch, of course, had not yet been decided at the time the 1948 legislation was enacted. However, as
the Bosch Court indicated, the 1948 legislative history contemplated that a federal court would be obliged to
give only "proper regard," not binding deference, to a prior state court decision, thus establishing the notion
that the federal courts would reach their own judgment about the correctness of state court decisions. Bosch,
387 U.S. at 464. Nevertheless, where a surviving spouse surrendered a bequest in connection with litigation,
Congress contemplated that the marital deduction would be unavailable and that no inquiry would be made
in the federal court concerning the spouse's right under state law to receive the bequest. See S. REP. No. 8010 13, at 4-5, reprintedin 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1226-27.
229 In Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938), the Court accepted the parties' settlement agreement for tax
purposes without making any judgment about the validity of the taxpayer's claim under state law. Perhaps,
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Prior to 1948, there was neither legislation nor regulations concerning the
availability or validity of disclaimers for tax purposes. The concept was purely
a state-law creation. The courts, however, imported the concept into the tax
law, holding that a disclaimer would be recognized as valid for tax purposes if
valid under state law. 30 Thus, the viability of a disclaimer for tax purposes
was made to turn on whether the disclaimant had satisfied all of the
requirements imposed by state law.23' Not surprisingly, the courts' wholesale
incorporation of state disclaimer law produced non-uniform results, the
availability of the disclaimer for tax purposes being dependent upon nothing
more than the law of the particular state involved . 32 For example, a disclaimer
by an intestate taker was not recognized for tax purposes if, under state law,
such a disclaimer was not permitted.2 33 If, on the other hand, a state enacted a
statute, as some states did, permitting an intestate taker to disclaim, the
disclaimer
would be respected
as valid for
tax purposes.2
In short,
with
no
tax policy justification
for differentiating
disclaimers
on the basis
of their
state-

in taking the position that a bequest surrendered by a spouse in the context of litigation should not qualify
for the marital deduction irrespective of the strength of the spouse's claim to retain the bequest under state
law, Congress simply borrowed the Lyeth Court's approach.
230 See Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933).
231 See id.
232 In 1994, in United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224 (1994), the Supreme Court ruled that the
incorporation approach that the lower courts had created before 1958 was inconsistent with the gift-tax
statute and therefore invalid. See E. Bruce Jorgenson, Note, Disclaimers of Interests Created Before
Enactment of the Gift Tax: United States v. Irvine, 48 TAx LAW. 553, 562 (1994) (indicating that the Irvine
Court had abandoned the pre-1958 cases). The Court held that a disclaimer made after the 1958 regulation
was promulgated but not coming within the scope of the regulation (either because the interest disclaimed
had been created before the enactment of the gift tax or because the disclaimed interest had been created by
an inter vivos document and the regulation appeared to be limited to transfers created by testamentary
instrument) constituted a taxable gift. See Irvine, 511 U.S. at 240. In the absence of the regulation, the gift
tax statute required that a disclaimer be treated as a taxable transfer. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
pointed to the inappropriateness of blindly following the policies driving state disclaimer law for federal tax
purposes. See id. at 238-40. In other words, the gift tax statute called for disclaimers to be treated as taxable
gifts until 1958, at which time, by virtue of Treasury's decision to promulgate the regulation, disclaimers
became entitled to be recognized as valid for tax purposes. Although this kind of radical change in the scope
of a statute's meaning, effected by a regulation promulgated long after enactment, might once have been
viewed as questionable, see, e.g., National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477
(1979) (holding that an interpretation of a statute contained in a regulation is entitled to weight where the
regulation is promulgated at the time of the statute's enactment, with further inquiry necessary if the
regulation is adopted later), such a view no longer would be appropriate given the deferential approach the
Court now takes with respect to regulations. See Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (holding that a
regulation adopted approximately one hundred years after enactment of the underlying statute was, because
of the statute's ambiguity, entitled to deference and that the regulation's interpretation of the statute was
therefore valid).
233 See Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952).
234 See Ellsworth, supra note 188, at 740-41.
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law validity, 35 the courts' incorporation approach represented an overemphasis
on state law and resulted in the lack of uniformity typically inherent in such an
overemphasis. 2 6
2. The 1958 Regulation
While, as suggested, 27 Congress did in 1948 make reference to disclaimers
in the context of the marital deduction, it was not until 1958 that the substantive elements of a valid disclaimer first became the focus of federal attention.
In the leading case accepting a valid state-law disclaimer as valid for tax purposes, Brown v. Routzahn,2" there was a delay of approximately eight years
between the date of the decedent's death and the date that the beneficiary under the will disclaimed.*3 9 Despite this delay, the court held that the disclaimer,
being valid under state law, was valid for tax purposes.? In 1958, the Treasury Department promulgated a regulation granting recognition for tax purposes
of disclaimers if valid under state law.2" In doing so, however, Treasury was
concerned about the excessive delay in Brown 2 and, as a consequence, imposed a new and additional federal timing requirement; in order to be valid for
tax purposes, the disclaimer not only had to be valid under state law but also
had to be "made within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of
the transfer." 243 Thus, under the 1958 regulation, for the first time, a disclaimer
satisfying all state-law requirements nevertheless would be invalid for tax purposes if not made within the regulation's time-frame, thus ending the courts'
willingness unhesitatingly to accept all disclaimers that were valid under state
law.24
In adopting a federal timing standard, the 1958 regulation began a gradual
reshaping of the connection between state disclaimer law and validity for tax
purposes. However, under the 1958 regulation, given its state law compliance

235 In 1968, the American Law Institute called for uniformity through federal standards in the disclaimer
rules. See AME, CAN L. INST., FED. ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJEcT 39-41 (1968).
236 See supraPart I.B.
237 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
235 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933).
239Il at 914-5.
240 l. at916-7.
241 This regulation can now be found at Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1997).
242 See Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 315 n.17 (1982).
243 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1997) (now applying only to taxable transfers creating

an interest in the person disclaiming before June 1, 1977).
244 See Jewett, 455 U.S. at 315-16.
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requirement, non-uniform results continued to occur. So, for example, under
the regulation, the validity of a disclaimer for tax purposes of an intestate
interest remained dependent upon its treatment under state law.24 Ultimately,
Congress defined the standards for tax-valid disclaimers in I.R.C. § 2518
("section 2518",' thereby further diminishing the overemphasis on state law
inherent in the courts' incorporation approach. 4
The 1958 regulation not only began the process of severing the connection
between state-disclaimer law and tax-disclaimer law; it also began the process
of federalizing tax-disclaimer law in a way that would narrow the
circumstances in which disclaimers could be utilized for tax purposes. Prior to
the regulation, it might have been possible to use a disclaimer in resolving an
estate-related litigation. 245

But, under the regulation, at least as construed by

the Supreme Court, it became more difficult as a practical matter to use
245 The regulation did, however, tend to limit the potential for non-uniform results. To illustrate, assume that State X permitted a disclaimer to be made within five years of the decedent's death, whereas all
other states required that it be made within one year of death. If, under the regulation, the Service determined that a disclaimer made in State X four years after the decedent's death was not made within a reasonable time and that it was therefore invalid for tax purposes, it could be said that the regulation had the effect
of diminishing the potential for non-uniformity; diselaimants in State X would no longer be permitted to
delay much longer than disclaimants in other states.
246 See I.R.C. § 2518 (1994).
247 See infra notes 254-64 and accompanying text.
248 Prior to the regulation, there was, as indicated, no federal timing requirement. In Brown the disclaimer was upheld as valid for tax purposes even though made eight years after the decedent's death. 63
F.2d at 916-17. As the Court in Jewett explicated, the critical fact in Brown was that the disclaimer was
made prior to the estate's distribution of the disclaimed interest, thus making it valid for state law purposes
and, concomitantly, for tax purposes. Jewett, 455 U.S. at 314. Hence, under the flexible timing approach
taken by the Court in Brown, a disclaimer could be utilized to effect a settlement long after death.
State law, at least in the form it took prior to the promulgation of section 2518, also supported the use
of disclaimers for settlement purposes. In many states, a beneficiary whose interest became the subject of
litigation could defer making the decision about whether to disclaim until after the nature of the beneficiary's rights had been determined by litigation. See, e.g., Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57, 63 (8th Cir.
1973) (referring to the Model Act to Provide for Disclaimer of Succession to Real Property proposed by the
ABA and indicating that, as a matter of state law, a beneficiary should be able to defer making a decision
about whether to accept or disclaim until the identity of the person entitled to receive the disclaimed interest
could be established); Estate of Koplin v. Koplin, 139 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (also referring to the Model Act and indicating that the time within which to disclaim did not start running until the
interest became "indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quanitity"); In re Estate of Ramsey, 622 P.2d 626,
629 (Kan. 1981) (holding that a beneficiary under a will who had commenced a construction proceeding
could disclaim within a reasonable time after the construction decree was issued); American L. Inst. Tax
Project, Special Committee on Disclaimer Legislation, Disclaimer of Testamentary and Nontestamentary
Dispositions-Suggestionsfor Model Acts, 4 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 658 (1969) (discussing Model
Act); American L. Inst. Tax Project, Special Committee on Disclaimer Legislation, Disclaimer of Testamentary and Nontestamentary Dispositions-Suggestionsfor a Model Act, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
131 (1968) (examining earlier version of Model Act).
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disclaimers as a settlement tool. For, in the typical litigation, the dispute is not
settled until long after the decedent's death. And, under the Supreme Court's
construction of the regulation, timeliness is measured from the date of death. 249
Thus, unless one could successfully argue that the reasonable-time standard
contained in the regulation was sufficiently flexible to accommodate a
settlement-related disclaimer made long after death, 5 0 the regulation
eliminated the possibility that a disclaimer could be used as a settlement tool in
the overwhelming majority of cases.25

So, for example, if, after the 1966

amendment, 25 2 a non-spouse beneficiary surrendered a bequest to the surviving
spouse in order to resolve a litigated dispute in a settlement occurring long
after the decedent's death, the 1958 regulation would in all likelihood prevent
a disclaimer from being used to generate a marital deduction for the
surrendered amount.5 3

249 See Jewett, 455 U.S. at 318.
250 It could, however, be argued that the Supreme Court in Jewett did not adopt a date-of-death approach
in the case of settlements. In Jewett, the disclaimer did not involve a settlement. Rather, the issue was
whether the timeliness of a disclaimer of a contingent remainder should be measured from the date of death.
See id. at 306. Indeed, in construing the regulation as requiring a date-of-death approach, the Court did
intimate that a disclaimant lacking knowledge of his or her interest in the estate until a time after death might
be able to disclaim within a reasonable time after learning of the interest. Id. at 312 (the Court emphasizing
that it "seldom" would be the case that the disclaimant did not learn of the interest until after death). It could
be argued that where an estate becomes the subject of litigation, a beneficiary who disclaims at the time of
settlement did not have knowledge of his or her interest in the estate at the time of death and that therefore
the date-of-death approach should not be invoked. In any event, as will be discussed, the date-of-death
approach adopted by section 2518 is an inflexible one that does not permit an exception for settlements. See
infra note 257 and accompanying text.
251 Another aspect of the regulation might have precluded the use of disclaimers as a settlement tool.
Under the regulation, a disclaimer could not be made once the disclaimant had accepted the interest. See
Treas. Reg. § 25.251 1-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1997). Because the assertion of rights in the course of litigation could well be viewed as an acceptance, a disclaimer might not have been available to effect a settlement
occurring after the commencement of the litigation. In DePaoliv. Commissioner, 62 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir.
1995), the court considered the validity of a settlement-related disclaimer under section 2518, which, like the
regulation, renders a disclaimer unavailable where acceptance has occurred. See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(3) (1994).
In holding the disclaimer valid, even though made after the disclaimant had commenced litigation to enforce
the disclaimed interest, the court emphasized that the Service had not argued that the disclaimant had accepted the interest, thus implying that a beneficiary who commences litigation to enforce an interest may be
viewed as accepting that interest and thereby precluded from disclaiming it.
252 As indicated earlier, the Code was amended in 1966 to permit a non-spouse beneficiary to disclaim
and thereby make the marital deduction available for the amount passing to the spouse as a result of the disclaimer. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
253 If, however, it could be established that the spouse had a legally enforceable right under state law to
receive the surrendered amount, the marital deduction would be permitted for the surrendered amount under
Bosch. See supra Part lI.B. Thus, the effect of making the disclaimer unavailable is to preclude the estate
from obtaining the marital deduction in the settlement context unless the spouse's entitlement to receive the
settlement amount can be established as a matter of state law.
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3. The 1976 Legislation
In 1976, Congress expanded the approach taken in the 1958 regulation, in
terms both of federalizing the tax-disclaimer standards and of narrowing the
circumstances in which a disclaimer could be utilized for tax purposes. The
1958 regulation had been criticized on the ground that its emphasis on state
law created the potential for non-uniform results.2
Responding to this
criticism, Congress in 1976 created uniform federal standards for determining
the tax effectiveness of disclaimers in section 2518.2" Under the section, a
disclaimer is not valid for tax purposes if executed more than nine months after
the transfer creating the interest, unless the disclaimant is a minor. 26 And,
while under the 1958 regulation the timing standard had some flexibility that
might have permitted a settlement-related disclaimer long after death, section
2518's nine-month rule has no such flexibility. 7
The 1976 legislation also became the subject of criticism. 8 While the
legislation was designed to address the non-uniform outcomes produced under
the 1958 regulation, it did not entirely eliminate the potential for such
outcomes. Under the legislation, a disclaimer was not valid for tax purposes
unless the disclaimed interest passed to a person other than the disclaimant
without any direction on the disclaimant's part.2 1' The effect of this rule was to
maintain the connection between tax validity and state-law validity. In other
words, in order for the disclaimer to be valid for tax purposes, the disclaimed
interest had to pass as a result of the disclaimer to someone other than the
disclaimant by operation of state law. And if, under state law, the disclaimer
was invalid or not permitted, the disclaimed interest could not pass by
operation of state law and the disclaimer therefore would be invalid for tax
purposes.2w For example, if state law required that a disclaimer be made
within six months of death, a disclaimer made eight months after death would
be invalid for tax purposes, even though it satisfied the federal nine-month
rule, because the disclaimed interest would not pass to another by operation of
state law.

254 See John H. Martin, Perspectiveson FederalDisclaimerLegislation, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 316, 320-23
(1979).
255 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1893 (1976) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994)).
256 Id. § 2518(b)(2).
257 Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c) (1997).
258 See Martin, supranote 254, at 323-26.
29 See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (1994).
260 See Martin, supranote 254, at 323-26.
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4. The 1981 Legislation
Concerned about its failure to achieve uniformity, Congress amended section 2518 in 1981.2" Under the amendment, a disclaimer would be valid for
tax purposes, even though it was invalid under state law and the disclaimed
interest therefore failed to pass by operation of state law, as long as the disclaimant made a transfer of the disclaimed interest to the person who would
have received it had the disclaimer satisfied state-law requirements.262 So, under the amendment, a disclaimer made eight months after the creation of the
interest where state law required that it be made within six months would be
valid for tax purposes as long as the disclaimant made the necessary transfer.
On the other hand, a disclaimer made ten months after the creation of the interest would be invalid for tax purposes under the amendment even if timely under state law. Although the amendment creates a trap for disclaimants who are
not sufficiently careful in preparing the disclaimer document 3-reflecting a
deficiency in the amendment that should be cured by further legislation2--it
261

Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, § 407 (codified at I.R.C.

§ 2518(c)(3) (1994)).
262 See Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 318 (1981) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994)); Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2518-1(c)(l)(ii) (1997) (applying to interests created before 1982); id. § 25.2518-1(c)(3).
263 In order for a disclaimer that is invalid under state law to be saved under I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3), the
transfer (to the person who would have received the disclaimed interest had the disclaimer been valid under
state law) must occur within the nine-month window. Where the disclaimer document is executed within the
nine-month period but is ultimately determined by the Service or the courts outside of the nine-month window to be invalid because of a failure to comply with state law, there will be no opportunity at the time of
the court's or the Service's determination to make the transfer. Thus, as a planning matter, it would be prudent to include in all disclaimer documents language providing that, if the disclaimer is held to be invalid
under state law, the disclaimed interest should be retained by the person who would have received it under
the disclaimer. See Estate of Delaune v. United States, 143 F.3d 995, 1001 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) (ruling that a
disclaimer that fails to comply with state law cannot be validated under section 2518(c)(3) unless the disclaimant executes a document of transfer within the nine-month period); Estate of Dancy v. Commissioner,
89 T.C. 550, 562 (1987) (finding execution of transfer document within nine-month period necessary), rev'd
on other grounds, 872 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1989); Mitchell M. Gans, Disclaimers, 46 INST. ON FED. TAX'N
§ 52.01, § 52.12, at 52-45 (1988) (suggesting that all disclaimer documents contain language effecting a
transfer of the disclaimed interest in the event the disclaimer is ultimately held invalid because of a failure to
comply with state law).
264 While the courts in Delaune, 143 F.3d at 1001 n.3, and Dancy, 89 T.C. at 562, in indicating that the
transfer document must be executed within the nine-month post-death period, clearly read current law correctly, there is no policy justification for invalidating a disclaimer for tax purposes merely because the disclaimant failed to foresee the possibility that the disclaimer would ultimately be held invalid under state law
and consequently failed to include the appropriate precautionary language in the disclaimer document. See
supra note 263. In order to avoid punishing the disclaimant for such a lack of foresight (assuming proposals
that would make state law irrelevant, such as those considered in Part IlI, infra, are not enacted), the statute
should be amended to provide that a failure to comply with state law would not invalidate the disclaimer for
tax purposes in circumstances such as the following: the disclaimant makes a good-faith effort to comply
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in all probability did eliminate the potential for non-uniform results by establishing a federal standard.
5. CurrentDeficiencies
The process of federalizing disclaimer standards for tax purposes in order
to achieve greater uniformity, which had begun in the 1958 regulation, was
thus brought to fruition in 1981. The fact that a federal standard has been
established does not necessarily mean, however, that the standard is a correct
one. Indeed, two deficiencies remain in current tax-disclaimer law. First, as a
practical matter the inflexible nine-month rule unfortunately renders
disclaimers unavailable as a settlement tool in the overwhelming majority of
265
cases.
Second, even though tax-disclaimer standards have been federalized,
current law still overemphasizes state law. If the disclaimer is to be valid for
tax purposes, the disclaimed interest must pass either in accordance with state
law or, where the disclaimer is not valid under state law, to the person who
would have received it had it been valid. 266 Thus, the identity of the person
receiving the disclaimed interest is determined by state law in all cases. In the
context of the marital deduction, why should it be necessary that the
disclaimed interest pass under state law to the surviving spouse? Why should
substantially with state disclaimer law within the nine-month period; the disclaimant does not, in the postdisclaimer period, take the position that the disclaimer is invalid; and within, for example, two months of
any declaration by a court of invalidity under state law, the disclaimant executes a document effecting a
transfer of the disclaimed interest to the person who would have received it had the disclaimer been valid
under state law.
265 If the statute were amended to create a more flexible timing rule in order facilitate the use of disclaimers in the settlement context, modification of the rules concerning consideration and acceptance would
also be necessary. Under current law, either one of these rules might invalidate a disclaimer made as part of
a settlement. The requirement that the diselaimant not accept any consideration in exchange for the disclaimer is not contained explicitly in the statute, which requires merely that the disclaimer be unqualified.
See I.R.C. § 2518(b) (1994). The regulations, however, make clear that the acceptance of any consideration
by the disclaimant taints the entire disclaimer. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1997); see
also Estate of Monroe v. Commissioner, 124 F.3d 699, 710 (5th Cir. 1997) (indicating that a disclaimer is
invalid where the disclaimant receives a bargained-for consideration). Indeed, under the regulation, it would
appear that if a beneficiary entitled to receive $100 under the will disclaimed the bequest in exchange for a
consideration of $1, the disclaimer would be entirely invalid. One might question why the disclaimant
should not be viewed as having accepted $1 of the bequest and as having validly disclaimed the balance.
See Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3 (1994) (permitting partial disclaimers of discrete interests in property). In any
event, a disclaimer made in connection with a settlement agreement effecting a release on the part of the
diselaimant might well be viewed as invalid under current law. For a discussion of how a settlement-related
disclaimer might be invalid on acceptance grounds under current law, see note 251 supra.
266 See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4), (c)(3) (1994).
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the marital deduction not be equally available where a non-spouse beneficiary
disclaims a bequest and directs that it pass to the surviving spouse? Under
current law, such a direction would disqualify the disclaimer.2 7 As a
consequence, no marital deduction would be permitted for the disclaimed
interest, and the disclaimant would be treated as having made a taxable gift.M
Were the 1981 model followed,269 however, the marital deduction would be
allowed in this context given that the disclaimed interest would eventually be
subject to tax in the surviving spouse's estate. In short, the 1981 model is
violated because, in requiring that the disclaimed interest pass without any
direction
by the disclaimant, section 2518 continues to overemphasize state
270
law.
II. ALTERNATIVES To CURRENT LAW
A. Overrule Bosch

There are several alternatives that would either eliminate state law from the
marital-deduction equation or diminish the present overemphasis on state law.
The most modest of these alternatives would overrule Bosch, leaving the
passing requirement otherwise intact.

267 Id. § 2518(b)(4).

268 See, e.g., Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 306 (1982); Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-1(b) (as
amended in 1997).
269 See supranotes 140-53 and accompanying text.
270 Even where the marital deduction is not at stake, section 2518 places too much emphasis on state
law. Given that the purpose of section 2518 is to permit the family to adjust the decedent's estate plan postmortem without imposing a higher tax than if the decedent had made the adjustment before death, there is no
justification for requiring that the disclaimed interest pass under state law. To illustrate, assume that the
decedent's will bequeaths her entire estate to her daughter. Assume further that the daughter has two sons,
A and B, and that she strongly prefers that her mother's estate go immediately to A. Unless the decedent's
will provided that the bequest would pass to A if the daughter disclaimed or predeceased, a disclaimer by the
daughter would probably result in the estate's passing under state law to A and B equally. See, e.g., UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-603(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 165-66 (1998) (providing that lapsed devise passes
equally to deceased devisee's descendants); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(d) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A.
207-08 (1998) (providing that disclaimerd interest passes as though disclaimant had predeceased decedent).
The only method by which the daughter could cause the estate to pass to solely to A would be by accepting
the bequest and then making a taxable gift to A. With proper planning, however, the decedent could have
drafted her will to provide for A without subjecting her daughter to the gift tax. By imposing the constraint
of state law on this family, section 2518 limits the family's ability to achieve on the same tax basis what the
decedent could have achieved, thus failing to remain faithful to its purpose. But see Ellsworth, supra note
188, at 757 (arguing that section 2518 should be repealed and that the validity of disclaimers for tax purposes should turn upon their validity under state law).
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Either of two variations might be substituted for the Bosch framework.
The first variation would give binding respect to state-court decrees, whether
issued by a court of last resort or by a lower court. The allocation of rights
contained in settlement agreements would be similarly conclusive. Thus, any
amount actually passing into the hands of the surviving spouse under either a
decree or a settlement agreement would qualify for the marital deduction,
without regard to whether the pre-agreement or pre-decree proceedings were
adversarial in nature and without regard to whether the decree or agreement
properly interpreted state law. While this variation would not eliminate all of
the cases in which Congress's 1981 model (which ties the deduction to
inclusion in the surviving spouse's estate) 27' is violated, it would apply the
model in all cases involving property passing to a surviving spouse under a
settlement agreement or decree. This variation corresponds to the position
taken by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Bosch.272
The second variation on the overrule-Bosch alternative, corresponding to
Justice Harlan's dissent, would give binding respect to state-court decrees and
settlement agreements as long as they were the product of adversarial litigation. 27 As in the first variation, the deduction would be allowed only for property actually passing into the hands of the spouse, thus again applying the 1981
model. 274 This variation, however, fails to apply the model in at least as many
cases as does the first variation. It would not permit the deduction in the case
of an agreement or decree found by the federal court to be the product of nonadversarial litigation, even though the property passing to the surviving spouse
would be included in his or her estate. This failure makes the first variation
preferable.
Both of these overrule-Bosch variations, however, may be susceptible to
taxpayer abuse in the sense that taxpayers might create litigation in order to
bring themselves within the new rule. Consider, for example, a decedent who
bequeaths her entire estate to her daughter. Assume that the decedent's
daughter is willing to transfer the bequeathed property to the decedent's spouse
in order qualify the estate for the marital deduction. Under present law, this
271 See supranotes 140-53 and accompanying text.
272 Bosch, 387 U.S. at 466 (Douglas, J., dissenting). It should be noted that in effect the Service has
adopted the approach suggested by Justice Douglas in the case of decrees issued prior to the death of the
decedent. See Rev. Rul. 73-142, 1973-1 C.B. 405; see also Verbit, supra note 3, at 456-62 (arguing for an
approach that would require the federal courts to accept as binding state court decrees on the rationale that
they usually represent the state court's best judgement as to what the decedent intended).
273 See Bosch, 387 U.S. at 471 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
274 See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
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could be accomplished by the daughter's disclaimer (assuming that, as a result
of the disclaimer, the property would pass under state law to the spouse).2 5
But if the daughter had a child and that child were unwilling to cooperate by
executing a disclaimer of any interest the child might become entitled to receive as a result of the daughter's disclaimer, the daughter's disclaimer would
not be sufficient to secure the marital deduction. 276 Assuming one of the two
overrule-Bosch variations were enacted, the daughter and the spouse might
well be able to secure the marital deduction without the child's cooperation by
bringing suit in state court and then executing a settlement agreement or securing a decree. While this technique might be somewhat more difficult to
implement under the second variation (because the Service could argue that the
litigation was not adversarial), one can imagine taxpayers using this technique
under the first variation. Indeed, it might work even under the second variation as well if the parties could convince the federal court that the litigation
was adversarial. Thus, although the two variations are designed to apply in the
context of litigated disputes, taxpayers might be able to manipulate these
variations and thereby secure their benefits in other contexts.277
B. DisregardingState Law: Actual Passing
While both of these overrule-Bosch variations would diminish the
importance of state law, neither would entirely eliminate its role. This
suggests the need to examine a less modest alternative, one that would make
state law completely irrelevant. Under this alternative, the test for determining
eligibility for the marital deduction no longer would focus on whether the
property passed into the spouse's hands as a result of state law. Instead, the
focus would be solely on whether the property actually passed into the
spouse's hands so that it would be available for inclusion in the spouse's estate
to the extent not consumed. Thus, if, after the decedent's death, a beneficiary
275 See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4)(A) (1994).
276

The property would fail to pass to the spouse on account of the daughter's disclaimer if, for example,

the will provided that the property pass to the daughter's child in the event the daughter predeceased. See
PAUL G. HASKELL, WILLS, TRusTs AND ADMINISTRATION 25 (2d ed. 1993) (indicating that, under state law,
the disclaimed interest passes as if the diselaimant had predeceased the decedent).
277 If either of the variations were adopted, it would be necessary to consider imposing a time limit so
that it could be utilized only in connection with settlements or decrees made within some reasonable time
after death. Somewhat analogously, I.R.C. § 2516 provides that a taxable gift does not occur in the divorce
context where property is transferred in satisfaction of certain marital or support rights if the transfer occurs
within a three-year period determined by the date of the settlement agreement. I.R.C. § 2516 (1994). The
timing issue will be examined further infra in connection with a discussion of an alternative that would
eliminate the consideration of state law entirely. See infra notes 278-89 and accompanying text.
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transferred property bequeathed to that beneficiary to the decedent's spouse,
the situation would be treated as if the decedent had bequeathed the property
directly to the spouse. The estate then would qualify for the marital deduction,
and the beneficiary would not be viewed as having made a taxable gift. This
alternative would have the salutary effect of increasing the number of cases in
which Congress's 1981 model is invoked. 2"
Although this alternative is somewhat similar to the treatment given
disclaimers under present law, there is an important difference. Under present
law, a disclaimer can be used to secure the marital deduction only if the
disclaimed property passes to the spouse under state law, without any direction
on the part of the disclaimant. 2" In contrast, under this alternative a nonspouse beneficiary would be permitted to transfer property to the spouse in
order to secure the marital deduction for the estate, even though the property
would pass under state law to someone other than the spouse if the beneficiary
were to disclaim.
By completely eliminating the role of state law in this
fashion, this alternative would appropriately make the marital deduction
available whenever the transferred property, to the extent unconsumed,
eventually would be subject to tax in the surviving spouse's estate. It also
would make it easier for families to achieve the same tax savings that the
decedent could have achieved, thus ameliorating the inequity of subjecting a
family to a greater tax liability because of the decedent's oversight..
To illustrate, in the example just considered, the daughter could make a gift
of the property received under the decedent's will to the decedent's spouse.
The family would be treated for transfer-tax purposes as if the gifted property
had passed directly from the decedent to the spouse. Thus, the estate would
qualify for the marital deduction, and the daughter would not be treated as
having made a taxable gift. This could all be accomplished without the need
for the cooperation of the daughter's child (cooperation that would be required
under current law).

For a discussion of the 1981 model, see supranotes 140-53 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (1994).
280 See AMERicAN L. INST., FED. ESTATE AND GIFr TAX PROJECr 40-41 (1968) (suggesting that a dis278
279

claimer should be valid for tax purposes even if the disclaimant selected the beneficiary to whom the disclaimed property would pass). In the United Kingdom, a beneficiary's transfer of assets by deed, if made
within two years of the decedent's death, is treated as if the decedent had made the transfer. See Inheritance
Tax Act, 1984, § 142 (Eng.).
281 See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
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Consider also how this alternative could be applied in the case of a QTIP
trust created postmortem. If, in the example under examination, the daughter
were concerned about the possibility that the spouse ultimately would
bequeath the unconsumed portion of the gifted property to another beneficiary,
the daughter might request that the property be placed in a trust providing that,
upon the spouse's death, the remainder pass back to the daughter. Under
present law, even if the daughter's child were willing to cooperate, this kind of
trust arrangement could not be achieved through a disclaimer&m If, however,
as a result of a QTIP election, the trust corpus would be includible in the
spouse's estate, there would be no reason to deny the marital deduction for the
property the daughter conveyed to the trust. Thus, giving recognition to the
1981 model, this alternative would permit a non-spouse beneficiary to convey
3
property received from the decedent to a QTIP trust created postmortem.2
Similarly, a surviving spouse should be able to give property bequeathed to
him or her to anyone he or she selects without triggering a greater tax liability
than if the decedent had made the gift directly.2 4 Under this alternative, a gift
made by a surviving spouse after the decedent spouse's death would be treated
as made directly from the decedent to the beneficiary selected by the spouse,
with no gift tax imposed on the spouse and no marital deduction allowed in the
decedent spouse's estate.2 Unlike the change proposed with respect to gifts
by a non-spouse beneficiary to a surviving spouse, this change cannot be
justified by reference to the 1981 model. The model's premise-that the
property will eventually be included in the spouse's estate-is not satisfied
where it is the spouse who relinquishes the bequest. Rather, the justification
derives from two principles: first, that the family ought to be permitted wide
scope in rearranging the decedent's property in the post-death period; and

282 See Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2518-3, 25.2518-2(d), (e) (as amended in 1997).
283 Permitting the creation of a QTIP trust postmortem is similar to the way in which non-citizen surviving spouses are treated under present law. The marital deduction, currently, is not available for a bequest
to a spouse who is not a U.S. citizen unless the bequest is made under a qualified domestic trust ("QDOr').
See I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2)(A) (1994). The surviving spouse, however, is permitted to create the necessary trust
after the death of the decedent. See I.R.C. § 2056(d)(2)(B) (1994).
284 Non-spouse beneficiaries should also be permitted to utilize this alternative. So, for example, in the
earlier hypothetical, see supra note 270, if the decedent's daughter made a gift to A, it should be treated as
made by the decedent directly to A (with no gift tax imposed on the decedent's daughter).
285 It is desirable from a planning perspective to cause a forfeiture of the marital deduction where it is
anticipated that the surviving spouse's marginal estate-tax bracket will be higher than the decedent spouse's
or where the decedent spouse has overfunded the marital bequest (i.e., failed to bequeath the entire unified
credit amount to a non-spouse beneficiary, resulting in the exposure of the surviving spouse to an unnecessary estate tax upon his or her subsequent death). See generally Pennell & Williamson, supranote 146.
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second, that the family should not be penalized for the decedent's failure to
plan properly."
This alternative also would eliminate all of the problems created under the
Bosch framework. Property actually received by the spouse would qualify for
the marital deduction, whether received under a decree, by a settlement agreement, by disclaimer or by the kind of gift contemplated by this alternative.287
Adopting this alternative requires that consideration be given to the
question of timing. It would seem inappropriate to permit a gift to qualify the
estate for the marital deduction where the gift is made long after the decedent's
death. Permitting the gift to be made over an extended period of time
following the decedent's death would create perhaps too much potential for
taxpayer abuse.2" Thus, a time limit would have to be established. Perhaps
the rule permitting gifts to qualify the estate for the marital deduction should
apply only within a reasonable time period, for example, within one year of the
decedent's death. But if such a time limit were adopted, it also would be
necessary to consider litigated disputes. Where estate-related litigation occurs,
such a one-year rule might prove too harsh. In most litigation of this kind,
settlement or resolution through decree often occurs long after death, thus
precluding the estate from qualifying for the marital deduction under the gift
technique if the one-year rule were rigidly applied in this context. In order to
permit families embroiled in litigation to utilize the gift technique, it would

286 A spouse making a gift to a non-spouse beneficiary would, under this alternative, be given an election. The spouse could elect to have the gift treated either as made directly from the decedent to the beneficiary selected by the spouse, with no gift tax imposed on the spouse and no marital deduction allowed in the
decedent spouse's estate, or as made from the decedent to the spouse in a marital-deduction-qualifying bequest, followed by a taxable gift from the spouse to the beneficiary. Under current law, a somewhat similar
election is available. If the spouse disclaims, the gift passes under state law. The disclaimer effects a forfeiture of the marital deduction, and the spouse is not treated as having made a taxable gift. In the alternative, if the spouse does not disclaim but instead makes a gift of the property, the decedent's estate does
qualify for the marital deduction, and the spouse is treated as having made a taxable gift. See generally Pennell & Williamson, supra note 146 (discussing the circumstances in which it is advisable in terms of planning to cause a forfeiture of the marital deduction). The crucial difference between the election this alternative would create and the election available under current law is that, under this alternative, there would be
no state-law restriction on the spouse's ability to choose a beneficiary.
287 While under present law the marital deduction is forfeited where the surviving spouse relinquishes a
bequest in connection with litigation, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text, this alternative would
permit the spouse to avoid such a forfeiture by making the same election that would be available to a spouse
relinquishing a bequest outside the litigation context. It would be illogical to impose a harsher tax regime on
a family merely because it was embroiled in litigation.
288 See Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 316 n.17 (1982) (suggesting that an extension of the disclaimer period for too long would create too many estate-planning opportunities for taxpayers).
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make sense to make an exception for property passing to the spouse under a
settlement agreement or decree. In the case of litigation, the gift technique
should be permitted as long as the gift is made within, say, three months after
the administration of the estate is terminated. 2"9 To avoid taxpayer abuse (i.e.,
a non-adversarial litigation commenced, for example, three years after death
for the sole purpose of utilizing the gift technique), it might be wise to limit the
litigation exception to those cases where the litigation is commenced within a
statutorily fixed period after death.
C. Abolishing the PassingRequirement
Finally, as a last alternative, it might be possible to make the marital
deduction available even where no property actually passes into the spouse's
hands, in effect abolishing the passing requirement. Whether or not the
property generating the marital deduction actually passes to the spouse is of no
consequence as long as it will be subject to tax in the surviving spouse's estate.
One approach would be to make the deduction available for any bequest, even
if made outright to a non-spouse beneficiary, provided that the surviving
spouse agreed to pay estate tax on the bequest at his or her death. 290 There are
practical difficulties with this approach, however. First, the estate of the
surviving spouse may not have sufficient assets to pay the tax. While the nonspouse beneficiary could be made contingently liable for the tax, there would
still be no assurance that sufficient assets would be available to pay the tax
inasmuch as the non-spouse beneficiary might consume all of the bequeathed
property prior to the surviving spouse's death. Second, under the theory of the
1981 model, where the marital deduction is allowed, the amount subject to tax
in the surviving spouse's estate must include the income and appreciation that
the bequeathed property generates from the date of the decedent's death to the
date of the surviving spouse's death. 29' While this effect is easily realized
289 However, making the timing hinge on the termination of estate administration could invite litigation
as to whether the administration of the estate was unduly delayed. See Brown v. United States, 890 F.2d
1329 (5th Cir. 1989) (litigation between the Service and the estate as to whether the administration of the
estate had been unduly prolonged).
290 But see Zelenak, supra note 150, at 1543-4 (arguing against the QTIP provision on the ground that
transfer tax should be imposed on the spouse who selects the ultimate transferee).
291 There are three kinds of trusts that can be utilized to secure the marital deduction: the QTIP trust, a
trust under which the spouse is given an income interest for life and a general power of appointment, and an
estate trust. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5), (7) (1994 & Supp. In 1997); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(b)(1) (as
amended in 1994). In the case of each of these trusts, as well as in the case of an outright bequest, the
amount bequeathed, together with the income and appreciation it generates, is included in the surviving
spouse's estate.
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under current law, whether the bequest to the spouse is outright or in a maritaldeduction-eligible trust 92 for the benefit of the spouse, it would be difficult to
realize where the decedent spouse made an outright bequest to a non-spouse
beneficiary.293

Both of these difficulties, however, would be eliminated if the bequest to a
non-spouse could qualify for the marital deduction only where made in trust.
To illustrate, assume that the decedent spouse bequeathed property to her
daughter in trust. If the surviving spouse agreed to include the trust corpus in
his estate294 and further agreed that any trust distributions of income or
principal made to the daughter (or to anyone other than the surviving spouse)
prior to the surviving spouse's death would be treated as his taxable gift,2 95
there would be no reason to deny the marital deduction to the decedent
spouse's estate.296 The assets held in trust would provide a source for the
payment of the estate tax at the surviving spouse's death. No portion of the
bequest, the income it had generated or the appreciation that had accrued
would escape tax in the surviving spouse's estate. 2
See supranote 291.
For example, suppose that the decedent spouse bequeathed $1,000,000 to her daughter and the
daughter had $1,000,000 of other assets as well. Assuming the daughter were to commingle her investments, it would be difficult to determine the amount of income and appreciation actually generated through
investing the bequeathed sum. Moreover, the analysis might be further complicated by the daughter's consumption: any portion of the income or appreciation generated by the bequeathed sum that the daughter consumed prior to the surviving spouse's death would have to be calculated so that it could be subjected to tax
in the surviving spouse's estate.
294 In 1969, the Treasury Department proposed a QTIP-like concept, under which the surviving spouse's
consent would be necessary in order to qualify the estate for the marital deduction. See U.S. DEP'T OF TIHE
TREASURY, TAX REFoRM STuDs AND PROPoSALS 358-60 (Comm. Print 1969); see also Abrams, supra note
136, at 21-24 (suggesting that the marital deduction be made available where the surviving spouse is given a
terminable interest, provided that the surviving spouse agrees, first, to include in his or her estate an amount
equal to the deduction taken in the decedent spouse's estate; and, second, to pay interest, from the date of the
decedent's death to the date of the surviving spouse's death, on the amount of estate tax saved in the decedent's estate on account of the deduction).
295 As in the case of QTIP trusts under current law, the spouse could be given a right of recovery for any
tax paid as against the person receiving a distribution from the trust. See I.R.C. § 2207A (1994 & Supp. III
1997).
296 This corresponds somewhat to scheme of the generation-skipping tax, which makes distributions to a
beneficiary prior to the termination of the trust a taxable event. See I.R.C. § 2612(b) (1994) (defining a taxable distribution).
297 Under such a trust, no portion of the trust's assets could be utilized to support the spouse. The deduction, therefore, could not be justified by the aspect of the 1981 model concerned with permitting the decedent spouse's resources to be applied to the consumption needs of the surviving spouse on a tax-free basis.
Nor could be it justified by the model's concern with double taxation; under current law, tax is imposed on
the estate of the spouse creating such a trust, and no further tax is imposed with respect to the trust at the
death of the surviving spouse. Rather, the deduction would be justified by the model's concern with reduc292

293
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ing distortion: if the deduction were permitted, the extent to which the transfer-tax system discriminates on
the basis of the content of a couple's testamentary scheme would be substantially diminished. Whether the
decedent spouse provided for the surviving spouse or a non-spouse beneficiary, transfer tax would not be
paid until the death of the surviving spouse, or the earlier distribution of trust assets to the non-spouse beneficiary, provided that the surviving spouse agreed.
It must be conceded that the suggestion that the marital deduction be allowed for a bequest to a nonspouse beneficiary could be viewed as somewhat radical. It should be emphasized, however, that the deduction would not generate any transfer-tax savings for wealthy taxpayers-though there might be some income-tax savings because of the basis provisions of I.R.C. § 1014 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997), an issue that
could be addressed in any legislation authorizing the deduction-and only modest transfer-tax savings for
others. Concomitantly, the loss to the government that the deduction would generate in lost revenue would
be minimal.
To illustrate, assume both spouses are subject to the maximum estate tax bracket (fifty-five percent).
A bequest of one dollar to the daughter of the first spouse to die would generate fifty-five cents in tax savings were the deduction permitted. But this tax savings would be surrendered in the form of an additional
estate tax of fifty-five cents at the death of the surviving spouse. And the value of the deferral-paying the
tax at the surviving spouse's death rather than at the death of the first spouse to die-would be offset by the
tax in the surviving spouse's estate on the income and appreciation accruing between the two deaths. See
Pennell & Williamson, supra note 146, at 52. In the case of less wealthy taxpayers, although some savings
might be enjoyed on account of the difference in marginal brackets between the two estates, the value of
deferral would be offset as in the case of wealthy taxpayers. Moreover, the spouse making the transfer
could, under present law, utilize the other spouse's marginal bracket for one-half of the transfer by making it
as an inter vivos gift and electing split-gift treatment under I.R.C. § 2513 (with one-half of the tax being paid
at the death of the first spouse to die and the other half being paid at the surviving spouse's death). See
I.R.C. § 2513 (1994).
Given that little or no tax savings would be made available by permitting the deduction for a nonspouse beneficiary, one might question whether the premise suggested in support of the deduction, concern
about distortion, in fact holds. While the value of the deduction may indeed be offset by an increased tax in
the surviving spouse's estate, thus eliminating any distortion based on a desire to minimize tax liability,
there is a psychological impulse against the early payment of tax that, irrespective of tax savings, can determine behavior. See Pennell & Williamson, supra note 146, at 49. Permitting the deduction for a gift to a
non-spouse beneficiary would eliminate the distortion based on this impulse.
It should also be noted that, under current law, a trust for the benefit of a non-spouse beneficiary
could be created with the transfer tax deferred until the surviving spouse's death. To illustrate, assume the
decedent spouse makes an outright bequest to the surviving spouse. Assume further that the surviving
spouse then makes an inter vivos gift in trust for the benefit of the non-spouse beneficiary. Provided that the
surviving spouse is not legally obligated to create the trust (a legal obligation based, for example, on a constructive trust theory would lead to a denial of the marital deduction in the decedent's estate) and retains the
power to alter somewhat the nature of the beneficiary's rights, no transfer tax is paid until the surviving
spouse's death. See I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2), 2038 (1994) (providing for inclusion in the transferor's estate
where the power to alter the beneficiary's rights is retained); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (as amended in 1983)
(providing that no taxable gift is made where the transferor retains the power to alter the beneficiary's
rights). But see Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-29-005 (Apr. 9, 1997) (invoking the doctrine of substance over form in
the context of a transaction between two spouses and concluding, in effect, that one spouse acted as the
agent of the other without any analysis as to whether or not the agent spouse had made a legally binding
commitment to perform the undertaking).
The possibility that deferral could be achieved under current law through such a technique is significant in two respects. First, permitting the deduction in the decedent spouse's estate for a gift to a nonspouse beneficiary would allow taxpayers to achieve directly and simply what they now can achieve indirectly and only through sophisticated planning. Second, this technique produces its own distortion. A
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Under current law, in contrast, in order to be eligible for a QTIP election,
the trust must require that income be payable solely to the spouse and prohibit
distributions of principal to anyone other than the spouse during the spouse's
life.2 8 In permitting the marital deduction for a bequest in trust authorizing
income or principal distributions to a non-spouse, this alternative would have
the positive effect of reducing distortion. A spouse who is inclined to place
wealth in a trust authorizing such distributions but who is discouraged from
doing so by the QTIP requirements no longer would be constrained by these
requirements. This alternative also would have the positive effect of reducing
the number of cases in which the marital deduction is inadvertently forfeited
because the decedent's will contains a poorly drafted trust that fails to satisfy
299
QTIP requirements.
a defective
QTIP trust
ordinarily
produces
double
taxation, 3°° such aWhereas
result would
not be possible
under
this alternative
if

spouse who wants to provide for a non-spouse beneficiary and who also wants to defer the tax until the surviving spouse's death must not, under current law, implement the arrangement through a legally binding
estate plan. The spouse must instead rely on the good faith of the surviving spouse. To the extent that current law discourages the spouse from adopting a legally binding plan, it creates distortion that would not
exist were the deduction permitted.
298 See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii) (1994).
299 A more limited alternative could be fashioned to deal with the double-taxation problem that can occur with a defective QTIP. Where trust distributions are in fact made by a defective QTIP to the surviving
spouse, they will be subject to tax at the surviving spouse's death, if not consumed, even though no marital
deduction is permitted in the decedent spouse's estate. Assume, for example, that the decedent spouse creates a discretionary trust with respect to income and principal and that the trust therefore does not qualify for
QTIP treatment. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1994 & Supp. II 1997) (providing that an election can be made
only if the trust requires that income be distributed to the spouse annually). Even though the property conveyed to the trust will not qualify for the marital deduction in the decedent spouse's estate, any discretionary
distributions in fact made will, if not consumed, be included in the surviving spouse's estate-thus producing double taxation. The credit provided for in I.R.C. § 2013, which is designed to ameliorate double taxation in certain circumstances, offers no assistance in this context. See I.R.C. § 2013 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)
(providing for credit on previously-taxed transfers); see also Rev. Rul. 67-53, 1967-1 C.B. 265 (denying the
I.R.C. § 2013 credit in the estate of the trust beneficiary where her interest under the trust is discretionary).
To eliminate the double-taxation problem inherent in the defective QTIP, I.R.C. § 2013 could be expanded
to provide the surviving spouse's estate with a credit for the portion of the estate tax previously paid in the
decedent spouse's estate attributable to amounts actually distributed to the surviving spouse. While the
credit would resolve the double-taxation issue, it would not be entirely satisfactory, for the payment of estate
tax at the death of the decedent spouse reduces the resources available to the surviving spouse for consumption purposes.
300 If, for example, the trust failed to qualify for a QTIP election because the instrument authorized the
trustee to invade for the benefit of a non-spouse during the surviving spouse's life, the income distributed to
the spouse would nevertheless be included in the spouse's estate, even though no marital deduction is
allowed in the decedent spouse's estate. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-03-031 (Jan. 22, 1999) (where trust
required that income be distributed currently to the spouse and state-court decree reforming the trust
prohibited principal invasions for the benefit of a non-spouse beneficiary during the spouse's life, trust was
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the surviving spouse executed the necessary agreement and thereby secured
the marital deduction for the decedent's estate.01 In completely abolishing the
passing requirement, this alternative would achieve these positive effects

without violating the 1981 model. Indeed, this alternative is attractive
precisely because it implements
the modelf more aggressively than does any
of the other alternatives.303
In sum, at the very least, one of the overrule-Bosch alternatives should be
adopted in order to eliminate the problems created by the Bosch framework.
not eligible for QTIP election, even though distributed income would be taxable in the spouse's estate,
because the prohibition in the decree was disregarded under Bosch).
301 One might argue that it is inappropriate to remove the required provisions that are protective of
surviving spouses. See Fellows, supranote 150; Gerzog, supranote 150 (arguing that the QTIP provision is
problematic because it increases the use of trusts in connection with marital bequests, thereby diminishing
the protection enjoyed by surviving spouses). But see Zelenak, supra note 150. As indicated earlier,
however, the current requirements can produce distortion and double taxation. See supra notes 158-61 and
accompanying text. State law might be better suited to providing appropriate protection for surviving
spouses. Whereas, for example, relevant variables like the length of the marriage can be easily taken into
account in formulating the elective share, see, e.g., UNI'. PROBATE CODE § 2-201 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A.
101 (1998) (making the elective share a function of the length of the marriage), few, presumably, would
maintain that the portion of the estate qualifying for the marital deduction should be made dependent upon
such a variable. Given the necessity for the surviving spouse's consent, this alternative neither leaves the
surviving spouse entirely without protection nor fails to respect the surviving spouse's autonomy. See
Estate of Clayton v. Commissioner, 976 F.2d 1486, 1498 (5th Cir. 1992) (indicating that if, in enacting the
QTIP provision, Congress had been concerned about providing protection for surviving spouses, it would
have given the power to make the QTIP election to the surviving spouse); see also sources cited supra note
150. Indeed, in the debate over whether the transfer-tax system should be retained, the proponents do not
defend the system on the ground that it provides protection for surviving spouses. See, e.g., Anne L. Alsott,
The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor
McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REV. 363 (1996); Graetz, supra note 144. Nevertheless, some might argue that the
need to provide protection for the surviving spouse justifies the resulting distortion and double taxation and
that it is appropriate to use federal tax law (rather than state law) to encourage or provide such protection.
See Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1729 (1998) (rejecting as justification for the QTIP provision, first, an argument based upon a
concern about distortion and, second, an argument that it is more appropriate to allow state law to control the
level of protection afforded surviving spouses).
302 See supranote 297.
303 If the actual-passing alternative were adopted instead and the decedent spouse's will contained a
trust not qualifying for QTIP treatment, no marital deduction would be permitted. In all probability, the
deduction could not be secured by a post-death gift because, as a matter of state law, the beneficial interests
under the trust could not be sufficiently altered so as to enable the beneficiaries to make the necessary gift to
the spouse. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Lav of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1985) (discussing the so-called Claflin doctrine, under which the beneficiaries of
a testamentary trust are generally unable to alter the terms of the trust). As a consequence, double taxation
probably would occur, because any distribution from the trust to the spouse would be subject to tax in the
spouse's estate even though no marital deduction is permitted, and the model would be violated. In contrast,
under this alternative, assuming the spouse agreed to be subject to tax on the trust's assets, the model would
be respected, and double taxation would be avoided.
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However, an alternative that would make state law entirely irrelevant and that
would therefore more aggressively implement the 1981 model would be preferable.
CONCLUSION

The marital deduction's passing requirement overemphasizes state law.
This overemphasis can be cured in several ways. At the very least, Bosch
should be overruled, while leaving the role that state law plays in the marital
deduction otherwise intact. Under more ambitious approaches, state law
would cease to have any relevance. Instead, the availability of the deduction
would turn upon the 1981 model. As long as the unconsumed portion of the
decedent spouse's property ultimately would be subject to tax at the death of
the surviving spouse, the decedent spouse's estate would qualify for the deduction.

